| Internet-Draft | VESPER | November 2026 |
| Wendt & Śliwa | Expires 5 May 2027 | [Page] |
This document defines VESPER (Verifiable STI Presentation and Evidence for RTU), a profile for the use of delegate certificates in STIR. VESPER profiles the binding of telephone number authority to a domain identifier, the STIR certificate and PASSporT specifications, ACME-based authority token issuance, and certificate transparency into a delegate certificate that associates the right-to-use for a telephone number with the entity behind the number asserted in the PASSporT orig claim. This document describes the certificate usage, a PASSporT usage profile for SIP signaling, and a portable Right-to-Use Token for use outside of SIP.¶
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The Secure Telephone Identity (STI) architecture, based on STI certificates [RFC8226], PASSporTs [RFC8225], and the SIP Identity header field [RFC8224], provides cryptographic integrity protection for calling information in real-time communications. These mechanisms verify that a telephone number was not modified in transit and that it was signed using credentials authorized for that number. They do not, on their own, establish that a telephone number is being used by the entity it was assigned to, or carry a verifiable entity identity that a relying party can recognize across channels.¶
VESPER addresses these gaps not by inventing new cryptographic machinery but by composing mechanisms that already exist. The one genuinely new element VESPER depends on, the binding of telephone number authority to a domain identifier within a single certificate, is specified separately in [I-D.wendt-stir-tn-domain-binding]. Everything else in this document describes how that bound certificate, together with STIR PASSporTs, ACME-based authority tokens, certificate transparency, and the existing STIR certificate profile, fit together into a coherent whole.¶
The result is a profile in which a delegate certificate serves as a single, auditable trust artifact: it carries the telephone numbers assigned to an entity and the domain that entity controls, and it is recorded in a transparency log. This document defines the roles, the certificate repository, the PASSporT usage profile, and the portable Right-to-Use Token, and it points to the binding specification for the underlying credential semantics.¶
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP 14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all capitals, as shown here.¶
This document uses terms defined in [RFC8226], [RFC9060], and [I-D.wendt-stir-tn-domain-binding], including TNAuthList, delegate certificate, domain identifier, and bound certificate. The VESPER delegate certificate referred to throughout this document is a bound certificate as defined in [I-D.wendt-stir-tn-domain-binding], used within the profile described here.¶
The VESPER profile is built around a delegate certificate [RFC9060] scoped to a set of telephone numbers carried in its TNAuthList [RFC8226], issued on the basis of a validated association between those numbers and the entity that holds the right-to-use for them. This certificate is a bound certificate as defined in [I-D.wendt-stir-tn-domain-binding]: its TNAuthList and its SubjectAltName domain identifier are co-validated at issuance, so the certificate attests that the same entity holds the right-to-use for the numbers and controls the domain, and that it is authorized to use those numbers as an originating identity in the communications signed under it. The subject of the certificate, referred to in this document as the Domain Operator, is the entity that demonstrated control of that domain and holds the right-to-use for those telephone numbers. VESPER uses this bound certificate as the anchor for all of its trust assertions.¶
The certificate is delegated from a parent certificate held by the authority responsible for that right-to-use, typically the Telephone Number Service Provider (TNSP) that assigned the numbers to the subject, or another organization that is authoritative for them in the telephone network and identified by an SPC. Following the delegation model of [RFC9060], Section 4.1, the parent certificate may be SPC scoped, and the scope of the VESPER delegate certificate MUST be encompassed by the parent's scope. The chain therefore expresses that a network-authoritative provider has delegated the right-to-use of specific telephone numbers to the subject of the VESPER delegate certificate.¶
The chain spans two levels of authentication. An SPC-scoped certificate authenticates a provider that is authoritative in the telephone network, which is the level at which STIR has been deployed to date. A telephone-number-scoped delegate certificate authenticates at the level of an individual telephone number and the entity assigned to use it. VESPER is concerned with the latter, and relies on the former for the authority it delegates.¶
VESPER is defined for telephone numbers. An identity expressed as a SIP URI carries a domain within the identifier itself, so the entity behind it is anchored in a domain by construction. A telephone number carries no such association: telephone number authority and domain control are administered independently of one another. VESPER addresses that gap, establishing as verifiable evidence that the entity holding the right-to-use for a telephone number is the same entity that controls a given domain.¶
A VESPER delegate certificate MUST carry the following, all as defined in their respective specifications:¶
Telephone number authority: one or more telephone numbers in the TNAuthList extension [RFC8226], representing the entity's right-to-use.¶
Domain identifier: a domain name in the SubjectAltName [RFC5280], bound to the telephone number authority as defined in [I-D.wendt-stir-tn-domain-binding].¶
Claim constraints: claim constraints are the mechanism by which the issuer governs what the subject may assert. A VESPER delegate certificate that authorizes any PASSporT claim beyond the baseline iat, orig, and dest claims, such as Rich Call Data [RFC9795], MUST carry the Enhanced JWT Claim Constraints extension [RFC9118]. Every STIR-defined PASSporT claim that the issuer does not authorize the subject to assert MUST be listed in mustExclude, and where an authorized claim has a defined set of values, permittedValues MUST be used to bound them. The baseline claims are always permitted and MUST NOT appear in mustExclude.¶
Transparency: an embedded Signed Certificate Timestamp as defined in [I-D.ietf-stir-certificate-transparency].¶
Validity: a short-lived validity period as described in [I-D.ietf-stir-certificates-shortlived].¶
Prior STIR specifications establish telephone number authority through the TNAuthList but do not bind that authority to the entity to which the number was assigned. VESPER relies on the binding defined in [I-D.wendt-stir-tn-domain-binding] to add a domain identifier as a corroborating signal: the domain that identifies the entity, control of which may be exercised on its behalf by another party. Because the domain identifier and the telephone number authority are co-validated at issuance, a relying party that validates a VESPER delegate certificate obtains evidence that a specific entity, identified by its domain, has been assigned the telephone numbers in the certificate. The strength of this signal comes from two independent trust chains, telephone number assignment and domain control, corroborating the same entity.¶
The bound domain is also where the entity states how it originates and signs calls and messages from its telephone numbers, in the STI declaration record defined in [I-D.wendt-stir-tn-domain-binding]. A relying party that has verified a VESPER PASSporT, or that has only a calling telephone number and a discovery mechanism meeting the requirements of that document, applies the declaration as described there. This document defines no declaration record tags.¶
VESPER binds two mechanically verifiable facts: control of a domain and authority to use a telephone number. Entity verification, often referred to as know-your-customer (KYC), and the legal identity of the entity are out of scope for VESPER. Whatever real-world verification a certificate authority performs at issuance is governed by CA policy and reflected in the domain identifier; VESPER neither defines nor replaces it.¶
A relying party does not inspect any provider's onboarding process. It verifies the cryptographic binding of domain control to telephone number authority against publicly auditable infrastructure, as the Web PKI does for domain-bound certificates. The domain identifier serves as a persistent, publicly verifiable network identifier to which telephone number authority is bound; the association between that identifier and a real-world entity is established and maintained outside the scope of this profile.¶
The VESPER delegate certificate authorizes the entity that holds it to use the telephone numbers it contains. Within that entity, individual users or automated agents may be further authorized through the entity's own governance, without being identified in the delegate certificate. A single telephone number may be authorized for use by multiple users or agents, as is common in shared lines and call center deployments. Where caller identity at the individual level is desired, mechanisms such as Rich Call Data [RFC9795] or other PASSporT extensions provide optional paths for conveying that information.¶
The VESPER delegate certificate is published at a stable HTTPS location, identified by the x5u of PASSporTs signed with it. The location can be a repository operated by the CA, by a provider signing on the Domain Operator's behalf, or by the Domain Operator itself. The Domain Operator MAY publish the certificate under its own domain, with a TLS certificate valid for the dNSName SubjectAltName of the VESPER delegate certificate.¶
Where it does, a relying party that retrieves the certificate from that location MAY treat the retrieval as reinforcing the domain association, as described in [I-D.wendt-stir-tn-domain-binding]. Retrieval is not a substitute for the binding established at issuance, and a certificate published elsewhere is equally valid.¶
This profile uses two token representations derived from the delegate certificate: a PASSporT as defined in [RFC8225] for use in SIP signaling, and a portable Right-to-Use Token, a JWT [RFC7519] that provides portable proof of right-to-use for contexts outside of SIP signaling, such as cases where evidence of telephone number association is required. Each is described in the sections below.¶
VESPER delegate certificates MUST be issued as bound certificates in accordance with [I-D.wendt-stir-tn-domain-binding], which requires that domain control and telephone number Right-to-Use be co-validated within a single issuance. The telephone number authority is established through an RTU Authority Token, issued by the authority responsible for the right-to-use of those numbers, typically the TNSP that assigned them, and validated via ACME mechanisms ([RFC9447], [RFC9448], [I-D.ietf-acme-authority-token-jwtclaimcon]). Where additional PASSporT claims are to be authorized, a JWTClaimConstraints Authority Token [I-D.ietf-acme-authority-token-jwtclaimcon] is presented during issuance.¶
At issuance, the STI Certification Authority MUST submit the certificate to a transparency log as defined in [I-D.ietf-stir-certificate-transparency], so that VESPER delegate certificates are publicly auditable. VESPER delegate certificates MUST be short-lived, as described in [I-D.ietf-stir-certificates-shortlived]; because these certificates are issued per entity and per telephone number, revocation does not scale, and a short lifetime is what bounds the use of a compromised key or a stale binding. Transparency and short lifetimes are requirements of the VESPER profile rather than of the underlying binding, which is defined independently of both. The certificate profile is otherwise that of a bound certificate, which conforms to [RFC8226] and [RFC9060].¶
This section describes how VESPER uses PASSporTs in SIP signaling. The construction and validation steps below apply the procedures of [RFC8224] and [RFC8225]; the one verification step specific to the telephone-number-to-domain binding is defined in [I-D.wendt-stir-tn-domain-binding] and referenced here.¶
When originating a call or message, the Authentication Service:¶
MUST construct a PASSporT containing orig, dest, iat, and any claims authorized by the certificate, as defined in [RFC8225], and MUST NOT include any claim that the certificate's claim constraints do not authorize.¶
MUST sign the PASSporT using a VESPER delegate certificate whose TNAuthList authorizes the orig telephone number.¶
MUST convey the certificate chain inline using the x5c header parameter and MUST include the x5u header parameter containing the HTTPS URL of the certificate at its repository location.¶
The following is the decoded header and payload of a VESPER PASSporT for a call from +1 202 555 0100, a number held by Universal Exports, the entity identified by universal-exports.example, to +1 202 555 0007. The x5c value is abbreviated. The signing certificate's TNAuthList contains 12025550100 and its SubjectAltName dNSName is universal-exports.example.¶
{
"alg": "ES256",
"typ": "passport",
"ppt": "rcd",
"x5u": "https://certs.q-branch.example/ue/a1b2c3.pem",
"x5c": ["MIIB...", "MIIC..."]
}
.
{
"orig": { "tn": "12025550100" },
"dest": { "tn": ["12025550007"] },
"iat": 1761681600,
"rcd": { "nam": "Universal Exports Ltd." }
}
¶
The x5u points to a repository operated by the CA rather than by the holder, which [I-D.wendt-stir-tn-domain-binding] permits. The rcd claim is present only because the signing certificate's claim constraints authorize it.¶
Upon receiving a PASSporT, the Verification Service MUST apply the validation procedures of [RFC8224] and [RFC8226], namely validating the PASSporT signature, validating the certificate chain to a trusted STIR trust anchor, confirming the TNAuthList authorizes the orig telephone number, validating the embedded SCT, and, where claim constraints are present, confirming that asserted claims conform.¶
In addition, the Verification Service MUST apply the relying party verification defined in [I-D.wendt-stir-tn-domain-binding], treating the domain identifier in the dNSName SubjectAltName as the identity of the right-to-use holder only as bound to the TNAuthList. The PASSporT MUST be rejected if any validation fails. After verification, the Verification Service applies the STI declaration record published at the bound domain, as described in [I-D.wendt-stir-tn-domain-binding].¶
When VESPER is used with Connected Identity [RFC9970], the destination party returns a PASSporT of type rsp in a SIP 200 OK, signed using a VESPER delegate certificate authorized for the dest telephone number. The rsp PASSporT includes the original orig and dest values and a fresh iat. The originating party verifies the rsp PASSporT using the same validation steps above, applied to the dest telephone number and the destination party's certificate.¶
The Right-to-Use (RTU) Token is a JWT [RFC7519] signed by the private key of the VESPER delegate certificate, with the certificate chain conveyed in the JOSE header using the x5c parameter. The delegate certificate is the trust artifact; the token signature demonstrates that the presenter holds the corresponding private key. The token provides portable evidence of right-to-use outside of SIP signaling. Established practice for demonstrating right-to-use outside of signaling relies largely on documents such as letters of authorization, which are not cryptographically verifiable and cannot be revoked once issued. The RTU Token provides a verifiable and short-lived alternative.¶
The RTU Token MUST include:¶
iss: the entity's domain identifier, matching the dNSName SubjectAltName of the signing certificate¶
iat and exp: issuance and expiration times; exp is set to a short validity interval to limit the replay surface¶
orig: the telephone number being asserted, consistent with the TNAuthList of the signing certificate¶
The token MAY include additional claims authorized by the claim constraints of the signing certificate, such as Rich Call Data [RFC9795], and MUST NOT include any claim that those constraints do not authorize.¶
The following is the decoded header and payload of an RTU Token by which Universal Exports proves its right-to-use for its London number, +44 20 7946 0007, valid for one hour. The signing certificate's TNAuthList contains 442079460007 and its dNSName is universal-exports.example. The x5c value is abbreviated.¶
{
"alg": "ES256",
"typ": "JWT",
"x5c": ["MIIB...", "MIIC..."]
}
.
{
"iss": "universal-exports.example",
"iat": 1761681600,
"exp": 1761685200,
"orig": { "tn": "442079460007" }
}
¶
A party receiving the token validates the signature with the certificate in x5c, validates the chain to a trust anchor it accepts, confirms that the certificate is a bound certificate whose dNSName matches iss and whose TNAuthList contains the orig telephone number, and checks iat and exp. The token then stands as evidence that, at iat, the entity identified by universal-exports.example held the right-to-use for 442079460007.¶
The VESPER trust artifacts defined in this document, the PASSporT and the Right-to-Use Token, are independent of how they are conveyed. They are signed by the VESPER delegate certificate and verified against the same bound certificate regardless of the path they travel. Where in-band signaling does not carry the artifact end to end, or where there is no in-band path between the parties, the same artifact can be conveyed through other mechanisms, including out-of-band publish-and-retrieve delivery. This is the case, for example, for messaging conveyed over non-SIP transports that cannot carry a PASSporT [RFC9475]. Such delivery mechanisms are specified separately and are not required in order to implement VESPER.¶
VESPER provides verifiable evidence that an entity identified by a domain identifier, and validated as holding the right-to-use for one or more telephone numbers, produced a signature over a communication. A successful verification establishes that the PASSporT or Right-to-Use Token was signed by a delegate certificate whose TNAuthList authorizes the asserted telephone number, that the same certificate binds a co-validated domain identifier, and that the certificate is recorded in a transparency log. It does not establish that the content of a communication is legitimate, and it attests to the identity of the entity only to the assurance carried by the domain identifier; the strength of that identification is the strength of the domain validation performed at issuance, as discussed in [I-D.wendt-stir-tn-domain-binding].¶
The assurance rests on two independent trust chains, the delegation of telephone number right-to-use and the validation of domain control, co-validated into a single certificate. Because they are bound at issuance, an adversary cannot forge the association by compromising only one: a delegate certificate for a telephone number does not confer control of an unrelated domain, and control of a domain does not confer right-to-use for numbers that were not delegated. The security of the co-validation, and the prohibition on issuing a certificate that carries one without the other, are defined in [I-D.wendt-stir-tn-domain-binding].¶
VESPER requires delegate certificates to be recorded in a transparency log [I-D.ietf-stir-certificate-transparency]. A certificate that improperly binds a domain to telephone numbers, through CA error or compromise, is therefore publicly observable, allowing the affected domain holder, the number authority, and independent monitors to detect it. Transparency does not prevent misissuance, but it makes covert misissuance impractical and bounds how long a mistaken or malicious binding can go unnoticed.¶
VESPER inherits the security properties and considerations of the mechanisms it composes. PASSporT signature and validation, certificate path validation, and handling of the SIP Identity header field are as defined in [RFC8224], [RFC8225], [RFC8226], and [RFC9060]; certificate issuance, including validation of the RTU Authority Token, is defined in [RFC9447], [RFC9448], and [I-D.wendt-stir-tn-domain-binding]. VESPER neither weakens nor overrides these, and a weakness in any composed mechanism is inherited by the profile.¶
Replay of a captured PASSporT or Right-to-Use Token is mitigated by the freshness of the iat claim, by a short exp interval on the Right-to-Use Token, and by the STIR replay mitigations of [RFC8224]. VESPER requires short-lived certificates [I-D.ietf-stir-certificates-shortlived], which reduce reliance on revocation and bound the interval over which a compromised key or stale binding remains usable; relying parties enforce certificate validity windows.¶
This document has no IANA actions.¶
The authors would like to acknowledge Jon Peterson for valuable feedback on this work, and the STIR working group for the foundational specifications on which VESPER builds.¶