]>

Austria christian@amsuess.com

TUD Dresden University of Technology

Helmholtzstr. 10 Dresden D-01069 Germany martine.lenders@tu-dresden.de

Internet CoRE CoRE, Web Linking, Proxy, URI, aliasing The Constrained Application Protocol (CoAP, ) is available over different transports (UDP, DTLS, TCP, TLS, WebSockets), but lacks a way to unify the addresses of these transports. This document provides terminology and provisions based on Web Linking and Service Bindings (SVCB, ) to express alternative transports available to a device, and to optimize exchanges using these. About This Document The latest revision of this draft can be found at . Status information for this document may be found at . Discussion of this document takes place on the core Working Group mailing list (), which is archived at . Subscribe at . Source for this draft and an issue tracker can be found at .

Introduction The Constrained Application Protocol (CoAP) provides multiple transport mechanisms: UDP and DTLS since , and TCP, TLS, and WebSockets since . Some additional transports are used in LwM2M , and even more are explored (, ). These are mutually incompatible in their wire format, but CoAP implementations commonly support several of them, and proxies can translate between them. CoAP currently lacks a way to indicate which transports are available for a given resource, and which endpoints are available for them. This document introduces ways to discover transports and how to use them. CoAP also lacks a unified scheme to label a resource in a transport-independent way. This document does not attempt to introduce any new scheme here, or raise a scheme to be the canonical one. Instead, each host or application can pick a canonical address for its resources, and advertise other transports in addition.

Terminology Readers are expected to be familiar with the terms and concepts described in CoAP . For web link based discovery, terminology introduced for link format is used (or, equivalently, web links as described in ). provides definitions for CoRE Resource Discovery. For DNS-based discovery, and provide the relevant definitions. The phrase "the transport indicated by (a URI)" is used as described in . A protocol that implements CoAP request-response semantics for a lower layer is called a "(CoAP) transport". When the term "endpoint" is used in this document, it is generalized from the definition to mean the transport and any multiplexing information particular to that transport. TBD List with source: "origin", "link context" "anchor" , "resolution service", "cross proxy" , "unique proxy" (this document), "canonical URI", "URI aliasing", ... --ML

Goals This document introduces provisions for the seamless use of different transport mechanisms for CoAP. Combined, these provide:

1. Enablement: Inform clients of the availability of other transports offered by servers.
2. No Aliasing: Any URI aliasing must be opt-in by the server. Any defined mechanisms must allow applications to keep working on the canonical URIs given by the server.
3. Optimization: Do not incur per-request overhead from switching transports. This may depend on the server's willingness to create aliased URIs.
4. Proxy usability: All information provided must be usable by aware proxies to reduce the need for duplicate cache entries.
5. Proxy announcement: Allow third parties to announce that they provide alternative transports to a host.

For all these functions, security policies must be described that allow the client to use them as securely as the original transport. This document will not concern itself with changes in transport availability over time, neither in causing them ("Please take up your TCP interface, I'm going to send a firmware update") nor in advertising their availability in advance. Hosts whose transport's availability changes over time can utilize any suitable mechanism to keep clients updated, such as placing a suitable Max-Age value on their resources or having them observable.

Core principle: Transport endpoints are proxies CoAP does not need any special provisions to send the same request for a single resource through different transports: A request to any globally addressable resource can be sent to any endpoint by phrasing it as a proxy request. Whether that endpoint is trusted to, capable of, and willing to relay that request, and how to find suitable endpoints to serve as a proxy for a request is discussed in this document. When resource identifiers have different meanings depending on the host, the applicability of this document is limited. Possibly not limited a lot, but we have not looked into those cases in detail yet. --CA Examples of such resources are those whose URIs include the loopback addresses or partially-qualified domain names.

Registered names and transport setup The CoAP specification is intentionally open about the resolution services by which indirect identifiers in the host portion of a CoAP URI are resolved, giving DNS as one example without going into details (). This document does not change any of that, but it does point out in the breadth of information that such a service can provide (e.g., providing multiple addresses, or metadata on services used on them), and gives a concrete example of the information that modern DNS idioms deliver (which it enables by performing a registration in ).

Concepts

Same-host proxy:

A CoAP server that accepts forward proxy requests (i.e., requests carrying the Proxy-Scheme option) exclusively for URIs that it is also the authoritative server for is defined as a "same-host proxy".

The distinction between a same-host proxy and any other proxy is only relevant on a practical, server-implementation and illustrative level; this specification does not use the distinction in normative requirements, and clients need not make the distinction at all.

Recommended proxy:

A proxy indicated by a server to be useful for accessing that server.

When talking of proxy requests, this document only talks of the Proxy-Scheme option. Given that all URIs this is usable with can be expressed in decomposed CoAP URIs, the need for using the Proxy-URI option should never arise. The Proxy-URI option is still equivalent to the decomposed options, and can be used if the server supports it.

Using URIs to identify transport endpoints The URI coap://[2001:db8::1] identifies a particular resource, possibly a "welcome" text. It is, colloquially, also used to identify the combination of a CoAP transport and the transport specific details. For precision, this document uses the term "the transport address indicated by (a URI)" to refer to the transport and its details that can be inferred by the scheme and origin of a URI; URIs that have empty and absent paths, queries and fragment identifiers are used in places where a URI is used for the transport address indicated by it. For many practical purposes, the distinction between a URI and the transport address indicated by it is irrelevant. Note that as such a URI may contain a registered name. As with any CoAP URI, resolution services apply. Therefore, it may indicate multiple transport endpoints. [ TBD: Do we want to extend this to HTTP proxies? Probably just not, and if so, only to those that can just take coap://... for a URI. ]

Finding suitable endpoints for a URI When a CoAP request is created by a client, a typical starting point is the URI of the target resource of the request. To send the request, a suitable endpoint needs to be discovered. This section lists how one or more such endpoints can be discovered. In some situations, a client decides to use a forward proxy to access the resource: either because it is explicitly configured to do so (), or because it has discovered a recommended proxy () In that case, it finds the endpoint of the configured proxy (using , if not given explicitly). The proxy then decides on an endpoint to which to forward the request on its own, (again using the tools described in this section). Otherwise, it uses the information of scheme and authority, often through a resolution service (). No matter how the endpoint (and thus transport) was discovered and whether a proxy is involved, it does not alter the URI of the resource being requested. The Proxy-Scheme, Uri-Host, and Uri-Port options are set as needed to ensure that the request keeps targeting the requested resource. This happens, respectively,

• If the URI scheme associated with the selected transport differs from the scheme of the request URI (or a proxy is used),
• If the hostname is not the default one for the transport (e.g., if it is not an IP literal in the UDP or TCP cases, or a proxy is used; DNS CNAME entries or SVCB target do not alter the hostname of the URI), or
• If a different port than the default one is used (as possible through SVCB record information).

Outside proxy cases, only talks of setting the Uri-Host to preserve the URI, and not of setting Proxy-Scheme or Uri-Port. That is because at the time of writing of , no mechanisms were available to select a different transport or port. Note that there is no meaningful difference in a client's behavior between when it is configured with a proxy, has discovered a proxy through links, or has discovered a completely different transport: this is the essence of "transport endpoints are proxies", see . The following two paragraphs may need a new home eventually to keep this section to the point. --CA For servers that follow the common pattern of exposing the same resources on all transports (and thus having multiple aliased URIs for the same resource) and that do not act as proxies for other systems, the presence of the Proxy-Scheme option introduced by using alternative transports has little practical consequence: such servers become same-host proxies, and can ignore the Proxy-Scheme option as long as they recognize the Uri-Host value (which they are already required to process). While a server is at liberty to create aliases, clients cannot infer from the presence of a transport for a host that URIs created from addressing that transport exist. For example, if coap://h.example.net/sensors/temp is a known resource, and CoAP over TCP on [2001:db8::1] is indicated as a transport endpoint, there is no reason for the client to assume that coap+tcp://[2001:db8::1]/sensors/temp exists, let alone is the same resource: Clients that access the known resource by establishing a TCP connection need to send the options Proxy-Scheme value "coap", the Uri-Host value "h.example.net", and the Uri-Path values "sensors" and "temp".

Processing scheme and authority To discover endpoints for a given URI, the scheme and the authority component of the URI are typical starting points for resolution services. The outcome of any resolution service is a list of transport candidates. It may be partially sorted, and may arrive piece by piece. In addition to the list of transport candidates, a resolution service may also provide general metadata of the endpoint (e.g., necessary or sufficient requirements on the endpoint's credentials, such as those present in TLSA records). Conceptually, each entry contains:

• Which CoAP transport is used, e.g., CoAP over TCP; typically expressed as a TLS Application Layer Protocol Negotiation (ALPN) ID.
• The transport's address details (e.g., an IP address and port number).
• Any additional metadata that facilitates communication (e.g., public keys for ).

While it is generally preferable for the lookup result to be complete, the resolution service might manage only partial information. From that partial information, further resolution may be performed, or the information may already suffice to send a request based on other known proxy information. Resolution services may have more structure in that list, may provide multiple choices in a single result, or may branch out in multiple layers. At a conceptual level, those are reduced to an expanded list of individual candidates.

Transport-unaware resolution The IP based transports specified so far (CoAP over UDP, DTLS, TCP, TLS, and WebSockets) all indicate the transport in their scheme, and either use their default port or indicate the port explicitly. The only remaining details of multiplexing information required are the IP version(s) and IP address(es) of the server. If the host component of the URI is a literal, that information is already available. If the host component of the URI is a registered name, a name resolution service is used for a simple name lookup: When DNS is used as a resolution service, AAAA (or A) records of the name are looked up. The /etc/hosts file and nsswitch "hosts" database can provide that same information. Additional metadata provided by this resolution service are the zone identifier (implied in DNS by using the zone the DNS response was obtained through) or additional records (such as the aforementioned TLSA records). Simple resolution services do not indicate which transports are available on the address. Servers reached that way can resort to to indicate alternative transports while exchanging initial data through the original transport, or to store information in link-format- / web-link-based information systems (such as a Resource Directory ).

Transport-aware resolution mechanisms Advanced resolution services provide information about which transports are available in addition to those of the previous section. For the DNS resolution mechanism, SVCB lookups described in provide that information. It is recommended that future transports are designed to utilize transport-aware resolution mechanisms; see for details.

Explicit proxy indication A server can advertise a recommended proxy by publishing a Web Link with the "has-proxy" relation, defined in this document, to a URI indicating its transport address. In particular (and that is a typical case), it can indicate its own network address on an alternative transport when implementing same-host proxy functionality. The semantics of a link from S to P with relation "has-proxy" ("S has-proxy P", <P>;rel=has-proxy;anchor="S") are that for any resource that has the same origin as S, the transport address indicated by P can be used to obtain that resource.

Example A constrained device at the address 2001:db8::1 that supports CoAP over TCP in addition to CoAP over UDP can self-describe like this:

Discovery and follow-up request through a "has-proxy" relation ;if="tag:example.com,sensor", ;rel=has-proxy;anchor="/" Req: to [2001:db8::1]:5683 on TCP Code: GET Proxy-Scheme: coap Uri-Path: /sensors/temp Observe: 0 Res: 2.05 Content Observe: 0 Payload: 39.1°C ]]>

The discovery process yields two links: The first describes the resource, the second describes that an additional (TCP) endpoint is available for all resources on this host. Note that generating this discovery file needs to be dynamic based on its available addresses; only if queried using a link-local source address, the server may also respond with a link-local address in the authority component of the proxy URI.

Operational concerns of discovered transport endpoints

Security context propagation Any security requirements posed by a server or client application on a CoAP request MUST be applied independently of the transport that is used to perform the request. If a transport cannot be used to satisfy the requirements, it is ineligible for use with the request (from a client's point of view), and unauthorized (from a server's point of view). If the requirements contain transport layer security, the proxy needs to present the credentials required of the server to the client, and those of the client to the server; this is only practical when the proxy is a same-host proxy. Some applications have requirements exceeding the requirements of a secure connection, e.g., (explicitly or implicitly) requiring that name resolution happen through a secure process and packets are only routed into networks where the application trusts that they will not be intercepted on the path to the server. Such applications need to extend their requirements to the sources used to obtain the endpoints (i.e., the source of any "has-proxy" statement or the SVCB data); a sufficient (but maybe needlessly strict) requirement for "has-proxy" statements is to only follow those that are part of the same resource that advertises the link currently being followed. adds further considerations.

Exception: Narrowing security requirements If a concrete application starts with a minimal set of security requirements, has no means of discovering security properties of the endpoint, and can only discovers security properties of a transport, it MAY describe how a first step of transport discovery narrows the security requirements. An example of this is where the target name of the SVCB record is used to set the hostname component of a URI and thus set security requirements. Before making use of this mechanism, alternatives such as using TLSA records should be exhausted.

Choice of endpoints It is up to the client whether to use an advertised endpoint, or (if multiple are provided) which to pick. Information about endpoints may be annotated with additional metadata that may help guide such a choice; defining such metadata is out of scope for this document. Clients MAY switch between endpoints as long as the source describing them is fresh; they may even do so per request. (For example, they may perform individual requests using CoAP over UDP, but choose CoAP over TCP for requests with large expected responses). When the information about endpoints is obtained through CoAP (e.g., as a "has-proxy" link), the client can use the describing representation's ETag to efficiently renew its justification for using the alternative transport.

Selection of a canonical origin While a server is at liberty to provide the same resource independently on different transports (i.e. to create aliases), it may make sense for it to pick a single scheme and authority under which it announces its resources. Using only one address helps proxies keep their caches efficient, and makes it easier for clients to avoid exploring the same server twice from different angles. When there is a predominant scheme and authority through which an existing service is discovered, it makes sense to use these for the canonical addresses. Otherwise, it is suggested to use the coap or coaps scheme (given that these are the most basic and widespread ones), and the most stable usable name the host has.

Unreachable canonical origin addresses For devices that are not generally reachable at a stable address, it may make sense to use a scheme and authority as the canonical address that cannot actually be dereferenced. The registered names available for that purpose depend on the resolution mechanisms in use. When the Domain Name System (DNS) is used, such names would not be associated with any A or AAAA records (but may still use, for example, TLSA records). Such URIs are only usable by clients that discover a suitable proxy along with the URI, and that can place sufficient trust in that proxy.

Advertisement through a Resource Directory In the Resource Directory (RD) specification , protocol negotiation was anticipated to use multiple base values. This approach has since been abandoned, as it would incur heavy URI aliasing. Instead, devices can submit their "has-proxy" links to the Resource Directory like all their other metadata. A client performing resource lookup can ask the RD to provide available (same-host-)proxies in a follow-up request by asking for ?anchor=<the-discovered-host>&rel=has-proxy. The RD may also volunteer that information during resource lookups even though the "has-proxy" link itself does not match the search criteria. [ It may be useful to define RD parameters for use with lookup here, which would guide which available proxies to include. For example, asking ?rt=tag:example.com,sensor&proxy-links=tcp could give as a result: <coap://[2001:db8::1]/s>;rt=tag:example.com,sensor,<coap+tcp://[2001:db8::1]/>;rel=has-proxy;anchor="coap://[2001:db8::1]/" This is similar to the extension suggested in . ]

Elision of Proxy-Scheme and Uri-Host A CoAP server may publish and accept multiple URIs for the same resource, for example when it accepts requests on different IP addresses that do not carry a Uri-Host option, or when it accepts requests both with and without the Uri-Host option carrying a registered name. Likewise, the server may serve the same resources on different transports. This makes for efficient requests (with no Proxy-Scheme or Uri-Host option), but is generally discouraged . To make efficient requests possible without creating URI aliases that propagate, the "has-unique-proxy" specialization of the "has-proxy" relation and the "is-unique-proxy" SVCB parameter are defined. A proxy is unique, if requests arriving at the proxy are treated the same no matter whether the scheme, authority, and port of the link context are set in the Proxy-Scheme, Uri-Host, and Uri-Port options, respectively, or all of them are absent. [ The following two paragraphs are both true but follow different approaches to explaining the observable and implementable behavior; it may later be decided to focus on one or the other in this document. ] While this creates URI aliasing in the requests as they are sent over the network, applications that discover a proxy this way should not "think" in terms of these URIs, but retain the originally discovered URIs (which, because "cool URIs don't change" , should be long-term usable). They use the proxy for as long as they have fresh knowledge of the "has-(unique-)proxy" statement. In a way, advertising "has-unique-proxy" can be viewed as a description of the link target in terms of SCHC : In requests to that target, the link source's scheme and host are implicitly present. While applications retain knowledge of the originally requested URI (even if it is not expressed in full on the wire), the original URI is not accessible to caches both within the host and on the network (for the latter, see ). Thus, cached responses to the canonical and any aliased URI are mutually interchangeable as long as both the response and the proxy statement are fresh. A client MAY use a unique proxy like a proxy and still send the Proxy-Scheme and Uri-Host options; such a client needs to recognize both relation types, as relations of the "has-unique-proxy" type are a specialization of "has-proxy" and typically do not carry the latter (redundant) annotation. [ To be evaluated -- on one hand, supporting it this way means that the server needs to identify all of its addresses and reject others. Then again, is a server that (like many now do) fully ignore any set Uri-Host correct at all? ] Example:

Follow-up request through a "has-unique-proxy" relation. Compared to the last example, 5 bytes of scheme indication are saved during the follow-up request. ;if="tag:example.com,collection", ;rel=has-unique-proxy;anchor="/" Req: to [2001:db8::1] via WebSockets over HTTPS Code: GET Uri-Path: /sensors/ Res: 2.05 Content Content-Format: application/link-format Payload: ;if="tag:example.com,sensor" ]]>

It is noteworthy that when the URI reference /sensors/temperature is resolved, the base URI is coap://device0815.example.com device0815 does not show up in . Also should Uri-Query be for [...],sensor but the response be [...],collection? -- ML and not its coaps+ws counterpart -- as the request is still for that URI, which both the client and the server are aware of. However, this detail is of little practical importance: A simplistic client that uses coaps+ws://device0815.proxy.rd.example.com as a base URI will still arrive at an identical follow-up request with no ill effect, as long as it only uses the wrongly assembled URI for dereferencing resources, the security context is the same, the state is kept no longer than the "has-unique-proxy" statement is fresh, and it does not (for example) pass the URI on to other devices.

Impact on caches [ This section is written with the "there is implied URI aliasing" mindset; it should be possible to write it with the "compression" mindset as well (but there is no point in having both around in the document at this time). It is also slightly duplicating, but also more detailed than, the brief note on the topic in ] When a node that performs caching learns of a "has-unique-proxy" statement, it can utilize the information about the implied URI aliasing: As long as the "has-unique-proxy" statement is fresh and trusted, requests for either of the origins can be served from the cache of the other origin.

Using unique proxies securely The elision of the hostname afforded by the "has-unique-proxy" relation is only possible if the required security mechanisms verify the scheme and host of the server. This is given for mechanisms based on Object Security for Constrained RESTful Environments (OSCORE) , where "unprotected message fields (including Uri-Host [...]) MUST NOT lead to an OSCORE message becoming verified". With TLS-based security mechanisms, name and scheme cannot be completely elided in general. While the use of the Server Name Indication (SNI) HostName field sets the default Uri-Host already, the scheme still needs to be sent in a Proxy-Scheme option to satisfy the requirement of . [ It may be possible to relax this requirement if the host publishes a trustworthy statement about serving the same content on all schemes; however, no urgent need for this optimization is currently known that warrants the extra scrutiny. ]

Self-description as a unique proxy The level of assurance a client needs from a server to elide the Uri-Host option in a request that was created from a URI with no IP address literal has been a controversial topic. [ Should we dig up old conversations, link to https://github.com/core-wg/wiki/wiki/CoAP-FAQ#q4, or just let the weight of a WG consensus-document-to-be do its work? ] The "has-unique-proxy" relation provides an easy way for a server to indicate that this is in fact allowed: A server can publish a statement such as </>;rel=has-unique-proxy in its /.well-known/core resource. A client that receives and understands it can thus elide the Uri-Host option in requests to the server as per the definition of the relation.

Third-party proxy services A server that is aware of a suitable cross proxy may use the "has-proxy" relation to advertise that proxy. If the transport used towards the proxy provides name indication (as CoAP over TLS or WebSockets does), or uses a large number of addresses or ports, it can even advertise a (more efficient) "has-unique-proxy" relation. This is particularly interesting when the advertisements are made available across transports, for example in a Resource Directory. How the server can discover and trust such a proxy is out of scope for this document, but generally involves the same kind of links. For instance, a server may obtain a link to a third-party proxy from an administrator as part of its configuration. The proxy may advertise itself without the origin server's involvement; in that case, the client needs to take additional care (see ).

HTTP based discovery and CoAP over WS request to a CoAP resource through a "has-unique-proxy" relation ;if="tag:example.com,collection", ;rel=has-unique-proxy;anchor="coap://device0815.example.com/" Req: to device0815.proxy.rd.example.com on WebSocket Host (indicated during upgrade): device0815.proxy.rd.example.com Code: GET Uri-Path: /sensors/ Res: 2.05 Content Content-Format: application/link-format Payload: ;if="tag:example.com,sensor" ]]>

Should Uri-Query be for [...],sensor but the response be [...],collection? -- ML

Generic proxy advertisements A third-party proxy may advertise its availability to act as a proxy for arbitrary CoAP requests. This use is not directly related to the transport indication in other parts of this document, but sufficiently similar to warrant being described in the same document. The resource type "CPA-core.proxy" can be used to describe such a proxy.

A CoAP client discovers that its border router can also serve as a proxy, and uses that to access a resource on an HTTP server. ;rt=CPA-core.proxy Req: to [fe80::1] via CoAP Code: GET Proxy-Scheme: http Uri-Host: example.com Uri-Path: /motd Accept: text/plain Res: 2.05 Content Content-Format: text/plain Payload: On Monday, October 25th 2021, there is no special message of the day. ]]>

The considerations of apply here. A generic advertised proxy is always a forward proxy, and cannot be advertised as a "unique" proxy as it would lack information about where to forward. A proxy may be limited in the URIs it can service, for technical reasons (e.g., when none of the URI's transports are supported by the proxy) or for policy reasons (only accessing servers inside an organizational structure). Future documents (or versions of this document) may add target attributes that allow specifying the capabilities of a proxy. [ An earlier version of this document contained a proxy-schemes attribute. This was discontinued because it could already not express whether a proxy could access IPv4 or IPv6 peers, and because the use of schemes is becoming less useful given the new recommendation of incorporating details from registered name resolution into the transport selection. ] The use of a generic proxy can be limited to a set of devices that have permission to use it. Clients can be allowed by their network address if they can be verified, or by using explicit client authentication using the methods of .

Client picked proxies This section is purely informative, and serves to illustrate that the mechanisms introduced in this document do not hinder the continued use of existing proxies. When a resource is accessed through an "actual" proxy (i.e., a host between the client and the server, which itself may have a same-host proxy in addition to that), the proxy's choice of the upstream server is originally (i.e., without the mechanisms of this document) either configured (as in a "chain" of proxies) or determined by the request URI (where a proxy picks CoAP over TCP and resolves the given name for a request aimed at a coap+tcp URI). A proxy that has learned, by active solicitation of the information or by consulting links in its cache, that the requested URI is available through a (possibly same-host) proxy, may use that information in choosing the upstream transport, to correct the URI associated with a cached response, and to use responses obtained through one transport to satisfy requests on another. For example, if a host at coap://h1.example.com has advertised </res>,<coap+tcp://h1.example.com>;rel=has-proxy;anchor="/", then a proxy that has an active CoAP over TCP connection to h1.example.com can forward an incoming request for coap://h1.example.com/res through that CoAP over TCP connection with a suitable Proxy-Scheme and Uri-Host on that connection. If the host had marked the proxy point as <coap+tcp://h1.example.com>;rel=has-unique-proxy instead, then the proxy could elide the Proxy-Scheme and Uri-Host options, and would (from the original CoAP caching rules) also be allowed to use any fresh cache representation of coap+tcp://h1.example.com/res to satisfy requests for coap://h1.example.com/res. A client that uses a forward proxy and learns of a different proxy advertised to access a particular resource will not change its behavior if its original proxy is part of its configuration. If the forward proxy was only used out of necessity (e.g., to access a resource whose indicated transport not supported by the client) it can be practical for the client to use the advertised proxy instead.

Service Binding Parameters for CoAP transports Discovery mechanisms that exist in DNS , DHCP, Router Advertisements , or other mechanisms can already provide details that would otherwise only be discovered later through proxy links. When those details are provided as Service Binding Parameters, this section describes their interpretation in the context of CoAP transport indication. This document is an SVCB mapping document as described in . As a non-normative overview, the mapping summary (following the template of ) is as follows: CoAP SVCB Mapping Summary

Mapped schemes	"coap", "coaps", "coap+tcp", "coaps+tcp", "coap+ws", "coaps+ws"
RR type	SVCB (64)
Name prefix	_coap for the default port of the scheme, else _$PORT._coap
Automatically Mandatory Keys	port, no-default-alpn
SvcParam defaults	alpn: according to scheme (or empty)
Special behaviors	Multiple mapped schemes; alpn default influenced by initial URI.
Keys that records must include	None

[ The following paragraph is outdated, but its replacement will depend on the outcome of IETF122 discussions. ] The subsections in this section are arranged to describe a sequential, consistent picture. The capabilities of this big picture are not exercised by any application known at the time of draft publication. It is instead backed by many small-scope use cases (such as bootstrapping issues of proxy-link based CoAP scheme unification, and also applications outside CoAP such as ) and presents a unified solution framework.

Discovering transport indication details from name resolution This document registers the _coap attrleaf label in using the pattern described in . The label enables the use of SVCB records. This path is chosen over the creation of a new SVCB-based RR type "COAP" because it is considered unlikely that DNS implementations would update their code bases to apply SVCB behavior; this assumption will be revisited before registration. The _coap label can be used during the resolution of URIs that use any CoAP scheme. The presence of an SVCB record for a registered name implies that any transport advertised in the record is suitable for proxying to resources of any CoAP scheme and that registered name, provided that a resource is available at that URI in the first place. This does not create URI aliasing: Any resource is still accessed at its original URI through the advertised proxy endpoints. It is possible through this to advertise transports without transport layer security for URIs with the schemes "coaps", "coaps+tcp", and "coaps+ws". Unless the application explicitly regards an object layer security mechanism as a sufficient replacement for transport layer security, those transports cannot be selected for operations on such URIs as per . Some SVCB parameters have defaults; for _coap, these are:

• port: 5683
• alpn: empty

As SVCB records were not specified for the existing CoAP transports originally, generic CoAP clients are not required to use the SVCB lookup mechanism, but MAY attempt it opportunistically in order to obtain a usable transport (or to obtain it faster). Applications built on CoAP MAY require clients to perform this kind of discovery. Adding such a requirement is particularly useful if the application frequently advertises URIs with a scheme that defaults to a transport which its clients may not support, or when the application makes use of functionality afforded by such as apex domain redirection. (Had the SVCB specification predated the first new CoAP transports, that mechanism might have been used in the first place instead of additional schemes). [ The following paragraph may need to be revisited depending on the outcome of IETF122 discussions. ] The effects on a client of seeing SVCB parameters are similar to those of seeing a "has-proxy" link from the origin to the URI built using . The precise implications of any DNSSEC-backed applicable credentials expressed in SVCB parameters are subject to ongoing discussion (especially with regard to whether they apply to the proxy or the origin server).

Service Parameters Several parameters are relevant in the context of CoAP, independently of whether they are used with SVCB records or Service Binding Parameters transported outside SVCB records, and independently of whether they apply to the _coap service or another service that can be used on top of CoAP (such as _dns):

• port: The CoAP service using the transport described in this parameter is reachable on this port (described in ). It is automatically mandatory. This document does not limit which ports can be used with CoAP.
• alpn: The ALPN "coap" has been defined for CoAP over TLS , and "co" for CoAP-over-DTLS in . If an ALPN service parameter is found, this indicates that the ALPN(s) and thus the CoAP transport that can be used on this address / port. For example, "co" indicates that DTLS (and thus UDP) is used. ALPN IDs are defined in this document and in for the CoAP transports that had no such identifier when they were specified. The default value of alpn when processing a URI (as in ) is the ALPN corresponding to the used scheme. The default value when not processing a URI (e.g., when processing service parameters from DNR ) is empty.
• no-default-alpn, mandatory, ipv4hint, ipv6hint: Used as described in .
• is-unique-proxy: This is a new parameter defined in this document, and equivalent to the "has-unique-proxy" link format parameter in its semantics. Its value is empty.
• Applications may extend the supported parameters. In particular, has already introduced the docpath parameter which indicates a path at which DNS-over-CoAP is available at the given address.

The following parameters are under consideration for inclusion in this list, but it is unsure whether they are suitable. Those parameters would describe the origin server and not the individual (proxy) transport through which it can be reached.

• cred: This is a new parameter defined in this document, and describes Concise Binary Object Representation (CBOR) Object Signing and Encryption (COSE) credentials that can authenticate the server, e.g., when used with Ephemeral Diffie-Hellman Over COSE (EDHOC). The cred parameter's value is a CBOR sequence of COSE Header maps as defined in . If the parameter is present, it indicates that the server can be authenticated by any credential expressed in the sequence. This is similar to the TLSA records specified in . A COSE Header map can express many properties, not all of which are sufficient to authenticate a peer on any given security mechanism. Without excluding applications that may process other entries, a practical criterion for whether a header map is suitable for EDHOC is that the header map could also be used in EDHOC as ID_CRED_R if the credential is sent by value. For example, a header map with a kccs entry can be used to indicate a public key including a Key ID (kid), and that public key does not need to be sent during the EDHOC exchange. Alternatively, a header map with an x5t entry identifies the end entity certificate the server presents by a thumbprint (hash). It is up to the application to define requirements for the provenance of the cred parameter, whether it needs to be provided through a secure mechanism, or whether the server is strictly required to present that credential. This is unlike TLSA, which needs to be transported through DNSSEC, because a cred parameter may be sent using other means than DNS (for example in DHCPv6 responses or Router Advertisements).
• edhoc-app-prof and edhocpath: The parameters describe how EDHOC can be used on the server; they are specified in .
• oauth-hints: This is a new parameter defined in this document, describing how Authentication and Authorization for Constrained Enviroments (ACE) using the OAuth 2.0 framework (ACE-OAuth) can be used with this service. Its value is a CBOR map containing AS Request Creation Hints as described in . While an empty map can be useful (hinting that the client should use its configured ACE-OAuth setup), typical useful keys are 1 (AS, indicating the URI of the Authorization Server), 5 (audience, indicating the name under which the service is known to the Authorization Server), and 9 (scope, when discovering a particular service rather than just getting transport information for a host). That data has the same shape as the server might use when responding to an attempt at an unencrypted connection. This can not only speed up the discovery of the right AS, but can also protect that information (e.g., when DNSSEC is used), and avoid the need for an unprotected first request. It is up to the application to define requirements for the use of such data. For example, it may require that the audience matches the requested hostname, or may require that the scope matches the kind of service being discovered. When expressed in text format, e.g., in DNS zone files, the CBOR diagnostic notation can be used.

Examples of using name resolution discovery and parameters

Generic client discovering transport options A generic client is directed to obtain coap://dev1.example.com/log. The hostname is resolved using the system's resolution mechanisms, resulting in DNS queries, see -- ML for these records: The following records are returned: In addition to the single option it had with just the IP address, it may now also choose to establish a TCP connection on the default port, to use port 61616 for UDP (which results in more compact frames on a 6LoWPAN link), or to use either of the TLS based options.

Application mandating SVCB An example policy of an application is to mandate client support for SVCB records, and to require that a security mechanism must be used where credentials are backed either by DNSSEC or by the Web PKI. A server operator is running in a legacy network that only provides an IPv4 address behind NAT with a dynamic public address, but has PCP available. After running PCP to open a UDP port, it learns that 192.0.2.4:5678 will be available for some time. It therefore updates its DNS record like this, and sets an accompanying record: When a client starts using coap://host.example.net/interactive, it looks up that record and verifies it using DNSSEC. It then proceeds to send EDHOC requests over CoAP to 192.0.2.4 port 5678, setting the Uri-Host option to "host.example.net". The client could also have initiated an EDHOC session if no cred parameter had been present, but then, it would have required that the server present some credential that could be verified through the Web PKI, for example an x5chain containing a Let's Encrypt certificate.

Producing requests for a discovered service If a discovery process of a service does not produce a URI but any combination of an address, hostname, or Service Binding Parameters, those can be converted to a CoAP URI, for which transport hints are already encoded in the parameters the URI is constructed from. An example of this is DNS server discovery . While it is up to the service to define the service's semantics, this section applies to any service whose use with CoAP is defined by a normative reference to this section:

• The client tries the available services with their ALPNs and CoAP transports according to its capabilities and the priorities and mandatory parameters as defined for Service Bindings.
• The service either defines a well-known path, or it defines a Service Binding Parameter that describes the service's path on the described endpoint, or it defines both (and the well-known path is the default in absence of the defined parameter). The value is a CBOR sequence of text strings, which represent Uri-Path options in a CoAP request, or (equivalently) the path of a Constrained Resource Identifier (CRI) reference . A parameter value that is not a well-formed CBOR sequence or in which any item is not a text string, is considered malformed. When expressed in text format, e.g., in DNS zone files, the CBOR diagnostic notation can be used. To access the service, a client sets the text string values of the used Service Binding parameter as Uri-Path options in the request. If the resource is unavailable, the client may continue with options that have a larger SvcPriority value associated (if such a property exists in the discovery method). An example of such an option is docpath as defined in . (As that document precedes this one, it repeats the same rules explicitly rather than reusing these rules).
• A Service Binding is accompanied by a hostname: For example, this is the hostname of the Encrypted DNS Resolver or the Special-Use Domain Name in the case of lookups, or the authentication-domain-name in the case of DHCP options or Router Advertisements. Unless its value is identical to the default value for Uri-Host (which is the case on transports with SNI), that name is added in the Uri-Host option.
• If the port Service Binding Parameter is set, the Uri-Port option is set to the port that is set in the port prefix of the query (or the default port of the CoAP transport used), unless that is its default value anyway.
• No Proxy-Scheme option is set.

By following the rules of or the equivalent rules for the respective CoAP transport, the service can be translated into a URI. This implies URI aliasing between the composed URIs of all transports if any of the transports use different schemes. The rules for setting Uri-Host and Uri-Port result in the authority component of the URI being equal to the Binding Authority defined in . Note that since different security policies may apply to service discovery and other application components that dereference URIs, any connections established while using the service and cache entries created by it need to be treated carefully, for example by using separate connection and cache pools.

Expressing Service Parameters as literals A method for expressing Service Parameters in URIs that do not use registered names is described in . Among other things, that mechanism allows encoding the full information obtained during service discovery in a URI instead of just the one choice taken. It is also required if different CoAP transports are using the same scheme (as is recommended in ) with IP address literals in URIs, for which, unlike for resolved names, no service parameters are available.

Guidance to upcoming transports When new transports are defined for CoAP, it is recommended to use the "coap" scheme (or "coaps" for (D)TLS-based transports). If the identifiers of the transport are IP-based and are typically resolved through DNS, authors of new transports are encouraged to specify how they are expressed in Service Binding records (), e.g., using an alpn parameter (which does not necessarily indicate the use of a (D)TLS-based transport), and if IP literals are relevant to the transport, to follow up on . If the native identifiers of the transport are compatible with the structure of the authority component of a URI, those identifiers can be used as an authority as-is. To help the client decide on the resolution mechanism, it may be helpful to register a subdomain of .arpa as described in . The guidance for users is to never attempt to resolve such a name, and for the implementation of the zone to return NXDOMAIN unconditionally. If the transport's native identifiers are incompatible with that structure (e.g., because they contain colons), the document may define some transformation. If a transport's native identifiers are only local, the .alt special-use TLD may be used instead. For example, CoAP over GATT removes the colons from Bluetooth Low Energy MAC addresses like 00:11:22:33:44:55 and combines them into authority components such as 001122334455.ble.arpa. Slipmux might use the locally significant device name /dev/ttyUSB0 as coap://ttyUSB0.dev.alt/. URIs created from such names may not indicate the protocol uniquely: Additional transports specified later may also provide CoAP services for the same name. In the sense of , both transports would be identified by that URI. That is not an issue as long as the protocols underneath the CoAP transport provide a means of advertising the precise protocol used. For example, a hypothetical CoAP transport for BLE that is not GATT based can be selected for the same scheme and authority based on data in the BLE advertisement.

Security considerations

Security context propagation Clients need to strictly enforce the rules of . Failure to do so, in particular using a proxy announced in this way based on a certificate that attests the proxy's name, would allow attackers to circumvent the client's security expectation. When security is terminated at proxies (as is the case with DTLS and TLS), a third-party proxy can usually not satisfy this requirement; these transports are limited to same-host proxies.

Traffic misdirection Accepting arbitrary proxies, even with security context propagation performed properly, would allow attackers to redirect traffic through systems under their control. Not only does that impact availability, it also allows an attacker to observe traffic patterns. This affects both OSCORE and (D)TLS, as neither protects the participants' network addresses. Other than the security context propagation rules, there are no hard and general rules about when an advertised proxy is a suitable candidate. Aspects for consideration are:

• When no direct connection is possible (e.g., because the resource to be accessed is served as coap+tcp and TCP is not implemented in the client, or because the resource's host is available on IPv6 while the client has no default IPv6 route), using a proxy is necessary if complete service disruption is to be avoided. While an adversary can cause such a situation (e.g., by manipulating routing or DNS entries), such an adversary is usually already in a position to observe traffic patterns.
• A proxy advertised by the device hosting the resource to be accessed is less risky to use than one advertised by a third party. The /.well-known/core resource is regarded as a source of authoritative information on the endpoint's CoAP related metadata, and can be queried early in the discovery process, or queried for verification (with filtering applied) after discovery through an RD. Other resources may be less trustworthy as they may be controlled by entities not trusted with the endpoint's traffic.

describes an extension to by which the client can verify that the server recognizes the proxy in use. This is similar to querying /.well-known/core for any proxies advertised there, but happens earlier in the connection establishment, and leaves the decision whether the proxy is legitimate to the server. This only conveys information about the URI of the proxy. The mapping of any hostname inside it to an IP address, or of an IP address to a routing decision, is left to the security mechanisms of the respective layers.

Protecting the proxy A widely published statement about a host's availability as a proxy can cause many clients to attempt to use it. This is mitigated in well-behaved clients by observing the rate limits of , and by ceasing attempts to reach a proxy for the Max-Age of received errors. Operators can further limit ill effects by ensuring that their client systems do not needlessly use proxies advertised in an unsecured way, and by providing their own proxies when their clients need them.

IANA considerations

Link Relation Types IANA is requested to add two entries into the Link Relation Type Registry last updated in : New Link Relation types

Relation Name	Description	Reference
has-proxy	The link target can be used as a proxy to reach URIs inside the origin of the link context.	RFCthis
has-unique-proxy	Like has-proxy, and using this proxy implies scheme and host of the target.	RFCthis

Resource Types IANA is requested to add an entry into the "Resource Type (rt=) Link Target Attribute Values" registry under the Constrained RESTful Environments (CoRE) Parameters: [ The RFC Editor is requested to replace any occurrence of CPA-core.proxy with the actually registered attribute value. ] Attribute Value: core.proxy Description: Forward proxying services Reference: [ this document ]

TLS Application-Layer Protocol Negotiation (ALPN) Protocol IDs IANA is requested to add the following entries to the TLS Application-Layer Protocol Negotiation (ALPN) Protocol IDs registry (). The identification sequences are suggestions to be approved by the designated experts.

Protocol	Identification sequence	Reference
CoAP (over UDP)	0x43 0x4f ("CO")	, RFCthis
CoAP (over TCP)	0x43 0x4f 0x41 0x50 ("COAP")	, RFCthis

Service Parameter Key (SvcParamKey) IANA is NOT YET requested to add the following entries to the SVCB Service Parameters registry (). The definition of this parameter can be found in .

Number	Name	Meaning
to be assigned	cred	COSE credentials identifying the server
to be assigned	oauth-hints	Describes how to obtain a token at an ACE Authorization Server

All entries have in common that their Reference is this document, }, and that their change controller is IETF.

Underscored and Globally Scoped DNS Node Names IANA is NOT YET requested to add the following entry to the Underscored and Globally Scoped DNS Node Names registry (in the DNS Parameters group) established in thereby enabling its use with SVCB records:

• SVCB, _coap, of this document

The request for registration is deliberately not expressed at this point because it is yet to be revisited whether the creation of a "COAP" RR type similar to the "HTTPS" RR type would be preferable.

References Normative References The Constrained Application Protocol (CoAP) is a specialized web transfer protocol for use with constrained nodes and constrained (e.g., low-power, lossy) networks. The nodes often have 8-bit microcontrollers with small amounts of ROM and RAM, while constrained networks such as IPv6 over Low-Power Wireless Personal Area Networks (6LoWPANs) often have high packet error rates and a typical throughput of 10s of kbit/s. The protocol is designed for machine- to-machine (M2M) applications such as smart energy and building automation. CoAP provides a request/response interaction model between application endpoints, supports built-in discovery of services and resources, and includes key concepts of the Web such as URIs and Internet media types. CoAP is designed to easily interface with HTTP for integration with the Web while meeting specialized requirements such as multicast support, very low overhead, and simplicity for constrained environments. This specification defines a model for the relationships between resources on the Web ("links") and the type of those relationships ("link relation types"). It also defines the serialisation of such links in HTTP headers with the Link header field. The Constrained Application Protocol (CoAP), although inspired by HTTP, was designed to use UDP instead of TCP. The message layer of CoAP over UDP includes support for reliable delivery, simple congestion control, and flow control. Some environments benefit from the availability of CoAP carried over reliable transports such as TCP or Transport Layer Security (TLS). This document outlines the changes required to use CoAP over TCP, TLS, and WebSockets transports. It also formally updates RFC 7641 for use with these transports and RFC 7959 to enable the use of larger messages over a reliable transport. This specification defines Web Linking using a link format for use by constrained web servers to describe hosted resources, their attributes, and other relationships between links. Based on the HTTP Link Header field defined in RFC 5988, the Constrained RESTful Environments (CoRE) Link Format is carried as a payload and is assigned an Internet media type. "RESTful" refers to the Representational State Transfer (REST) architecture. A well-known URI is defined as a default entry point for requesting the links hosted by a server. [STANDARDS-TRACK] In many Internet of Things (IoT) applications, direct discovery of resources is not practical due to sleeping nodes or networks where multicast traffic is inefficient. These problems can be solved by employing an entity called a Resource Directory (RD), which contains information about resources held on other servers, allowing lookups to be performed for those resources. The input to an RD is composed of links, and the output is composed of links constructed from the information stored in the RD. This document specifies the web interfaces that an RD supports for web servers to discover the RD and to register, maintain, look up, and remove information on resources. Furthermore, new target attributes useful in conjunction with an RD are defined. This document specifies the "SVCB" ("Service Binding") and "HTTPS" DNS resource record (RR) types to facilitate the lookup of information needed to make connections to network services, such as for HTTP origins. SVCB records allow a service to be provided from multiple alternative endpoints, each with associated parameters (such as transport protocol configuration), and are extensible to support future uses (such as keys for encrypting the TLS ClientHello). They also enable aliasing of apex domains, which is not possible with CNAME. The HTTPS RR is a variation of SVCB for use with HTTP (see RFC 9110, "HTTP Semantics"). By providing more information to the client before it attempts to establish a connection, these records offer potential benefits to both performance and privacy. The SVCB DNS resource record type expresses a bound collection of endpoint metadata, for use when establishing a connection to a named service. DNS itself can be such a service, when the server is identified by a domain name. This document provides the SVCB mapping for named DNS servers, allowing them to indicate support for encrypted transport protocols. This document defines Object Security for Constrained RESTful Environments (OSCORE), a method for application-layer protection of the Constrained Application Protocol (CoAP), using CBOR Object Signing and Encryption (COSE). OSCORE provides end-to-end protection between endpoints communicating using CoAP or CoAP-mappable HTTP. OSCORE is designed for constrained nodes and networks supporting a range of proxy operations, including translation between different transport protocols. Although an optional functionality of CoAP, OSCORE alters CoAP options processing and IANA registration. Therefore, this document updates RFC 7252. Concise Binary Object Representation (CBOR) is a data format designed for small code size and small message size. There is a need to be able to define basic security services for this data format. This document defines the CBOR Object Signing and Encryption (COSE) protocol. This specification describes how to create and process signatures, message authentication codes, and encryption using CBOR for serialization. This specification additionally describes how to represent cryptographic keys using CBOR. This document, along with RFC 9053, obsoletes RFC 8152. This document describes the Concise Binary Object Representation (CBOR) Sequence format and associated media type "application/cbor-seq". A CBOR Sequence consists of any number of encoded CBOR data items, simply concatenated in sequence. Structured syntax suffixes for media types allow other media types to build on them and make it explicit that they are built on an existing media type as their foundation. This specification defines and registers "+cbor-seq" as a structured syntax suffix for CBOR Sequences. This document describes a Transport Layer Security (TLS) extension for application-layer protocol negotiation within the TLS handshake. For instances in which multiple application protocols are supported on the same TCP or UDP port, this extension allows the application layer to negotiate which protocol will be used within the TLS connection. Formally, any DNS Resource Record (RR) may occur under any domain name. However, some services use an operational convention for defining specific interpretations of an RRset by locating the records in a DNS branch under the parent domain to which the RRset actually applies. The top of this subordinate branch is defined by a naming convention that uses a reserved node name, which begins with the underscore character (e.g., "_name"). The underscored naming construct defines a semantic scope for DNS record types that are associated with the parent domain above the underscored branch. This specification explores the nature of this DNS usage and defines the "Underscored and Globally Scoped DNS Node Names" registry with IANA. The purpose of this registry is to avoid collisions resulting from the use of the same underscored name for different services. Universität Bremen TZI Fraunhofer SIT The Constrained Resource Identifier (CRI) is a complement to the Uniform Resource Identifier (URI) that represents the URI components in Concise Binary Object Representation (CBOR) rather than as a sequence of characters. This approach simplifies parsing, comparison, and reference resolution in environments with severe limitations on processing power, code size, and memory size. This RFC updates RFC 7595 by adding a column on the "URI Schemes" registry. // (This "cref" paragraph will be removed by the RFC editor:) After // approval of -28 and nit fixes in -29, the present revision -30 // contains two more small fixes for nits that were uncovered in the // RPC intake process. Informative References W3C n.d. n.d. OMA SpecWorks n.d. This document specifies Ephemeral Diffie-Hellman Over COSE (EDHOC), a very compact and lightweight authenticated Diffie-Hellman key exchange with ephemeral keys. EDHOC provides mutual authentication, forward secrecy, and identity protection. EDHOC is intended for usage in constrained scenarios, and a main use case is to establish an Object Security for Constrained RESTful Environments (OSCORE) security context. By reusing CBOR Object Signing and Encryption (COSE) for cryptography, Concise Binary Object Representation (CBOR) for encoding, and Constrained Application Protocol (CoAP) for transport, the additional code size can be kept very low. Universitaet Bremen TZI Lobaro UG Many research and maker platforms for Internet of Things experimentation offer a serial interface. This is often used for programming, diagnostic output, as well as a crude command interface ("AT interface"). Alternatively, it is often used with SLIP (RFC1055) to transfer IP packets only. The present report describes how to use a single serial interface for diagnostics, configuration commands and state readback, as well as packet transfer. Interaction from computers and cell phones to constrained devices is limited by the different network technologies used, and by the available APIs. This document describes a transport for the Constrained Application Protocol (CoAP) that uses Bluetooth GATT (Generic Attribute Profile) and its use cases. This document describes a mechanism in Transport Layer Security (TLS) for encrypting a message under a server public key. This document defines a protocol for exchanging DNS queries (OPCODE 0) over the Constrained Application Protocol (CoAP). These CoAP messages can be protected by (D)TLS-Secured CoAP or Object Security for Constrained RESTful Environments (OSCORE) to provide encrypted DNS message exchange for constrained devices in the Internet of Things (IoT). A collection of extensions to the Resource Directory [rfc9176] that can stand on their own, and have no clear future in specification yet. Discussion Venues This note is to be removed before publishing as an RFC. Discussion of this document takes place on the Constrained RESTful Environments Working Group mailing list (core@ietf.org), which is archived at https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/browse/core/. Source for this draft and an issue tracker can be found at https://gitlab.com/chrysn/resource-directory-extensions. This document defines how to compress Constrained Application Protocol (CoAP) headers using the Static Context Header Compression and fragmentation (SCHC) framework. SCHC defines a header compression mechanism adapted for Constrained Devices. SCHC uses a static description of the header to reduce the header's redundancy and size. While RFC 8724 describes the SCHC compression and fragmentation framework, and its application for IPv6/UDP headers, this document applies SCHC to CoAP headers. The CoAP header structure differs from IPv6 and UDP, since CoAP uses a flexible header with a variable number of options, themselves of variable length. The CoAP message format is asymmetric: the request messages have a header format different from the format in the response messages. This specification gives guidance on applying SCHC to flexible headers and how to leverage the asymmetry for more efficient compression Rules. RISE AB RISE AB Object Security for Constrained RESTful Environments (OSCORE) can be used to protect CoAP messages end-to-end between two endpoints at the application layer, also in the presence of intermediaries such as proxies. This document defines how to use OSCORE for protecting CoAP messages also between an origin application endpoint and an intermediary, or between two intermediaries. Also, it defines how to secure a CoAP message by applying multiple, nested OSCORE protections, e.g., both end-to-end between origin application endpoints, as well as between an application endpoint and an intermediary or between two intermediaries. Thus, this document updates RFC 8613. The same approach can be seamlessly used with Group OSCORE, for protecting CoAP messages when group communication with intermediaries is used. This document specifies new DHCP and IPv6 Router Advertisement options to discover encrypted DNS resolvers (e.g., DNS over HTTPS, DNS over TLS, and DNS over QUIC). Particularly, it allows a host to learn an Authentication Domain Name together with a list of IP addresses and a set of service parameters to reach such encrypted DNS resolvers. RISE AB RISE AB The CoAP protocol was designed with direct connections and proxies in mind. This document defines mechanisms by which chains of proxies can be set up. In combination, they enable the operation of hidden services and of clients similar to how Tor (onion routing) enables it for TCP-based protocols. This document specifies an Application-Layer Protocol Negotiation (ALPN) ID for Constrained Application Protocol (CoAP) services that are secured by DTLS. Encrypted communication on the Internet often uses Transport Layer Security (TLS), which depends on third parties to certify the keys used. This document improves on that situation by enabling the administrators of domain names to specify the keys used in that domain's TLS servers. This requires matching improvements in TLS client software, but no change in TLS server software. [STANDARDS-TRACK] RISE AB RISE AB The Lightweight Authenticated Key Exchange (LAKE) protocol requires certain parameters to be agreed out-of-band, in order to ensure its successful completion. To this end, application profiles specify the intended use of LAKE to allow for the relevant processing and verifications to be made. In order to ensure the applicability of such parameters and information beyond transport- or setup-specific scenarios, this document defines a canonical, CBOR-based representation that can be used to describe, distribute, and store LAKE application profiles. Furthermore, in order to facilitate interoperability between LAKE implementations and support LAKE extensibility for additional integrations, this document defines a number of means to coordinate the use of LAKE application profiles. Finally, this document defines a set of well-known LAKE application profiles. This specification defines a framework for authentication and authorization in Internet of Things (IoT) environments called ACE-OAuth. The framework is based on a set of building blocks including OAuth 2.0 and the Constrained Application Protocol (CoAP), thus transforming a well-known and widely used authorization solution into a form suitable for IoT devices. Existing specifications are used where possible, but extensions are added and profiles are defined to better serve the IoT use cases. Universität Bremen TZI This document formalizes and consolidates the definition of the Concise Diagnostic Notation (CDN) of the Concise Binary Object Representation (CBOR), addressing implementer experience. Replacing CDN's previous informal descriptions, it updates RFC 8949, obsoleting its Section 8, and RFC 8610, obsoleting its Appendix G. It also specifies registry-based extension points and uses them to support text representations such as of epoch-based dates/times and of IP addresses and prefixes. // (This cref will be removed by the RFC editor:) This revision -29 // attempts to implement various change requests not covered in -28 // that have been discussed in the 2026-08-19 and 2026-09-30 WG // interim meetings, but does not attempt to reflect the outcome of // those discussions. The text also does not have WG input yet on // any renaming decisions (CDN name, b1/t1 name). This document updates RFC 1035 by constraining the allowed value of the QDCOUNT parameter in DNS messages with OPCODE = 0 (QUERY) to a maximum of one, and it specifies the required behavior when values that are not allowed are encountered. The Port Control Protocol allows an IPv6 or IPv4 host to control how incoming IPv6 or IPv4 packets are translated and forwarded by a Network Address Translator (NAT) or simple firewall, and also allows a host to optimize its outgoing NAT keepalive messages. This document defines Discovery of Designated Resolvers (DDR), a set of mechanisms for DNS clients to use DNS records to discover a resolver's encrypted DNS configuration. An Encrypted DNS Resolver discovered in this manner is referred to as a "Designated Resolver". These mechanisms can be used to move from unencrypted DNS to encrypted DNS when only the IP address of a resolver is known. These mechanisms are designed to be limited to cases where Unencrypted DNS Resolvers and their Designated Resolvers are operated by the same entity or cooperating entities. It can also be used to discover support for encrypted DNS protocols when the name of an Encrypted DNS Resolver is known. This memo describes the management and operational requirements for the address and routing parameter area ("arpa") domain. This document specifies an Internet Best Current Practices for the Internet Community, and requests discussion and suggestions for improvements. This document reserves a Top-Level Domain (TLD) label "alt" to be used in non-DNS contexts. It also provides advice and guidance to developers creating alternative namespaces. Universität Bremen TZI RFC 7252 defines the Constrained Application Protocol (CoAP), along with a number of additional specifications, including RFC 7641, RFC 7959, RFC 8132, and RFC 8323. RFC 6690 defines the link format that is used in CoAP self-description documents. Some parts of the specification may be unclear or even contain errors that may lead to misinterpretations that may impair interoperability between different implementations. The present document provides corrections, additions, and clarifications to the RFCs cited; this document thus updates these RFCs. In addition, other clarifications related to the use of CoAP in other specifications, including RFC 7390 and RFC 8075, are also provided. This document specifies "Alternative Services" for HTTP, which allow an origin's resources to be authoritatively available at a separate network location, possibly accessed with a different protocol configuration. Thing to thing communication in Constrained RESTful Environments (CoRE) relies on URIs to link to servers. Next to hierarchical configuration and short-lived IP addresses, this document introduces a naming scheme for devices based on cryptographic identifiers. A special purpose domain is reserved for expressing those identifiers, and mechanisms for constrained devices to announce their names and to look them up are described. ARM The Constrained RESTful Application Language (CoRAL) defines a data model and interaction model as well as a compact serialization formats for the description of typed connections between resources on the Web ("links"), possible operations on such resources ("forms"), and simple resource metadata. The Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP) is a stateless application-level protocol for distributed, collaborative, hypertext information systems. This document describes the overall architecture of HTTP, establishes common terminology, and defines aspects of the protocol that are shared by all versions. In this definition are core protocol elements, extensibility mechanisms, and the "http" and "https" Uniform Resource Identifier (URI) schemes. This document updates RFC 3864 and obsoletes RFCs 2818, 7231, 7232, 7233, 7235, 7538, 7615, 7694, and portions of 7230. As IPv6 deployment increases, there will be a dramatic increase in the need to use IPv6 addresses in text. While the IPv6 address architecture in Section 2.2 of RFC 4291 describes a flexible model for text representation of an IPv6 address, this flexibility has been causing problems for operators, system engineers, and users. This document defines a canonical textual representation format. It does not define a format for internal storage, such as within an application or database. It is expected that the canonical format will be followed by humans and systems when representing IPv6 addresses as text, but all implementations must accept and be able to handle any legitimate RFC 4291 format. [STANDARDS-TRACK] This RFC is an official specification for the Internet community. It incorporates by reference, amends, corrects, and supplements the primary protocol standards documents relating to hosts. [STANDARDS-TRACK] This document describes the commonly used base 64, base 32, and base 16 encoding schemes. It also discusses the use of line-feeds in encoded data, use of padding in encoded data, use of non-alphabet characters in encoded data, use of different encoding alphabets, and canonical encodings. [STANDARDS-TRACK] A Uniform Resource Identifier (URI) is a compact sequence of characters that identifies an abstract or physical resource. This specification defines the generic URI syntax and a process for resolving URI references that might be in relative form, along with guidelines and security considerations for the use of URIs on the Internet. The URI syntax defines a grammar that is a superset of all valid URIs, allowing an implementation to parse the common components of a URI reference without knowing the scheme-specific requirements of every possible identifier. This specification does not define a generative grammar for URIs; that task is performed by the individual specifications of each URI scheme. [STANDARDS-TRACK] TUT Ericsson CoAP has been standardised as an application-level REST-based protocol. When multiple transport protocols exist for exchanging CoAP resource representations, this document introduces a way forward for CoAP endpoints as well as intermediaries to agree upon alternate transport and protocol configurations as well as URIs for CoAP messaging. Several mechanisms are proposed: Extending the CoRE Resource Directory with new parameter types, introducing a new CoAP Option with which clients can interact directly with servers without needing the Resource Directory, and finally a new CoRE Link Attribute allowing exposing alternate locations on a per-resource basis.

Change log This section is to be removed before publication. Since draft-ietf-core-transport-indication-10:

• Use 'recommended proxy' as a defined term consistently.
• Editorial updates.

Since draft-ietf-core-transport-indication-09:

• edhoc-info replaced with app-profiles' edhoc-app-prof.

Since draft-ietf-core-transport-indication-08:

• Explicitly become an SVCB mapping document for the CoAP schemes.
• Remove coaptransport parameter; instead, request ALPNs for remaining protocols.
• Point out issue about some metadata pertaining to transport choices and some metadata pertaining to the server itself.
• Acknowledge that there is structure (e.g., in SVCB lookups) that is conceptually flattened.
• Sulkily accept DNS-over-CoAP reaching into target names as an exception in security requirements.
• Editorial updates.

Since draft-ietf-core-transport-indication-07:

• Update sections 1 and 2:
  • Work more explicitly with 7252's resolution services.
  • List (coarsely) the information received from resolution services.
  • Homogenize treatment of proxy URIs and other resolution service outcomes.
  • Point out parallels to /etc/hosts.
• Phrase possible differences w/rt hop-to-hop vs. end-to-end encryption more carefully.
• SVCB: Rename edhoc-cred to cred.
• Rework literals following discussion around onion-coap.
• Point out the fates of appendices.
• Editorial fixes.

Since draft-ietf-core-transport-indication-06:

• Split introduction into terminology (with new definitions), goals and concepts.
• Add principle of operation into abstract, elevating SVCB and has-proxy to equally ranked sources of endpoint information.
• Restructure document to split overview and operations from the concrete methods of obtaining endpoints.
• Add is-unique-proxy SVCB parameter equivalent to has-unique-proxy relation.
• Remove _coaps service, describing _coap as applying to all CoAP transports.
• Add SVCB to abstract.
• Remove distracting text on URIs identifying transports/endpoints.
• Editorial changes.
• IANA considerations: Set change controller to IETF.

Since draft-ietf-core-transport-indication-05:

• Semantics for where a has-proxy applies were changed from "wherever there is a hosts relation" to "across the same origin". The hosts relation has received complaints about its complexity, and there were no strong voices in either direction during or after IETF119 when the question has been asked; going for the easier version.
• Use of SVCB is added as a section. Underscore prefixes are registered for CoAP, enabling the use of SVCB DNS records for applications that opt in to it (rather than processing it as an alternative history). While the alternative history section was appreciated during IETF119, the authors found it highly impractical to provide SVCB ground work without having the actual registrations (it would have worked only because DNS discovery acts on a separate _dns prefix anyway), and chose the consistent approach of allowing SVCB lookups.
• Material from the DNS and DNR for CoAP documents was moved in (and overhauled in the process):
  • Constructing CoAP requests from Service Parameters that did not result from a hostname lookup is described.
  • The coaptransport SVCB parameter is defined.
  • SVCB hints for ACE/OAuth are defined.
• Section on how a host can tell that Uri-Host is optional was moved from Open Questions into a section. This had been around for ages, and gathering some more experience with the matter, looks like the obvious approach.
• Editorial:
  • Style for unallocated registrations changed from TBD to CPA
  • References updated
  • Tooling updates
  • Minor fixes

Since draft-ietf-core-transport-indication-04:

• Not just the scheme, but also the authority value influences the transport selection.
  • Add guidance section for new transports.
  • Point out that registered names already can fan out to different addresses.
• Rephrase and simplify security considerations, especially by limiting unique proxying for TLS.
• Add recommendation to new scheme authors to use "coap"/"coaps" and let the resolution process guide the selection.
  • Remove proxy-schemes attribute from core.proxy because of its greatly reduced value.
• Update "Related work" appendix to cover SVCB instead of SRV records
• Rename to "Transport Indication", using "protocol" only for other protocols, in established phrases, or when referring to CoAP as a general protocol.
• Add note linking CoAP over WS's .well-known/coap to dohpath
• Remove OSCORE vs. unique-proxy open point
• EDHOC EAD: Describe response option content
• Editorial updates

Since draft-ietf-core-transport-indication-03:

• Added appendices on alternative history and Literals beyond IP addresses. The remaining document was not brought in sync with those new parts.

Since draft-ietf-core-transport-indication-02:

• Added EAD appendix, adjusted security considerations to match.

Since draft-ietf-core-transport-indication-01:

• Simplify same-host proxy behavior by referring to existing RFC7252 mandate.
• proxy-links= lookup: Refer to prior art.

Since draft-ietf-core-transport-indication-00:

• Add section on canonical URIs that are not necessarily reachable.
• Clarify that the the "hosts" relation is followed transitively.
• Cross reference with compatible multicast-notifications concept.

Since draft-amsuess-core-transport-indication-03:

• No changes (merely changing the name after WG adoption)

Since -02 (mainly processing reviews from Marco and Klaus):

• Acknowledge that 'coap://hostname/' is not the proxy but a URI that (in a particular phrasing) is used to stand in for the proxy's address (while it regularly identifies a resource on the server)
• Security: Referencing traffic misdirection already in the first security block.
• Security: Add (incomplete) considerations for unique-proxy case.
• Narrow down "unique" proxy semantics to those properties used by the client, allowing unique proxies to be co-hosted with forward proxies.
• "Client picked proxies" clarified to merely illustrate how this is compatible with them.
• Use of "hosts" relation sharpened.
• Precision on how this does and does not consider changing transports.
• "Related work" section demoted to appendix.
• Add note on DTLS session resumption.
• Variable renaming.
• Various editorial fixes.

Since -01:

• Removed suggestion for generally trusted proxies; now stating that with (D)TLS, "a third party proxy can usually not satisfy [the security context propagation requirement]".
• State more clearly that valid cache entries for resources aliased through has-unique-proxy can be used.
• Added considerations for Multipath TCP.
• Added concrete suggestion and example for advertisement of general proxies.
• Added concrete suggestion for RD lookup extension that provides proxies.
• Minor editorial and example changes.

Since -00:

• Added introduction
• Added examples
• Added SCHC analogy
• Expanded security considerations
• Added guidance on choice of transport, and canonical addresses
• Added subsection on interaction with a Resource Directory
• Added comparisons with related work, including rdlink and DNS-SD sketches
• Added IANA considerations
• Added section on open questions

Related work and applicability to related fields This section is to be removed before submission to the IESG, with at least the MP-TCP section worked into corr-clar .

On HTTP The mechanisms introduced here are similar to the Alt-Svc header of in that they do not create different application-visible addresses, but provide dispatch through lower transport implementations. In HTTP, different versions of the protocol (i.e., different transports) are distinguished using a protocol identifier equivalent to an ALPN. This works well because all relevant transports use transport layer security and thus can use ALPNs. In contrast, the currently specified CoAP transports predate ALPNs, and specify per-transport schemes, which enable the use of URIs that indicate transports. To accommodate the message size constraints typical of CoRE environments, and accounting for the differences between HTTP headers and CoAP options, information is delivered once at discovery time. Using the "has-proxy" and "has-unique-proxy" relations with HTTP URIs as the context is NOT RECOMMENDED; the HTTP provisions of the Alt-Svc header and ALPN are preferred.

Using DNS DNS Service Binding resource records (SVCB RRs) described in can carry many of the details otherwise negotiated using the proxy relations. In HTTP, they can be used in a way similar to Alt-Svc headers. SVCB records were not specified when CoAP was specified for TCP. If at any point SVCB records for CoAP are defined, name resolution produces a set of transport details that can be used immediately without the need for a "has-proxy" link. Explicit "has-proxy" links would still be relevant for third-party-advertised proxies.

Using names outside regular DNS Names that are resolved through different mechanisms than DNS, or names which are defined within the scope of DNS but have no universally valid answers to A/AAAA requests, can be advertised using the relation types defined here and CoAP discovery. In , a server using a cryptographic name as described in is discovered and used.

Obtaining a sensor value from a local device with a global name ;rel=has-unique-proxy; anchor="coap://nbswy3dpo5xxe3denbswy3dpo5xxe3de.ab.rdlink.arpa" Req: to [2001:db8::1]:5683 on TCP Code: GET OSCORE: ... Uri-Path: /sensors/temp Observe: 0 Res: 2.05 Content OSCORE: ... Observe: 0 Payload: 39.1°C ]]>

Multipath TCP When CoAP over TCP is used over Multipath TCP and no Uri-Host option is sent, the implicit assumption is that there is aliasing between URIs containing any of the endpoints' addresses. As these are negotiated within MPTCP, this works independently of this document's mechanisms. As long as all the server's addresses are equally reachable, there is no need to advertise multiple addresses that can later be discovered through MPTCP anyway. When advertisements are long-lived and there is no single more stable address, several available addresses can be advertised (independently of whether MPTCP is involved or not). If a client uses an address that is merely a proxy address (and not a unique proxy address), but during MPTCP finds out that the network location being accessed is actually an MPTCP alternative address of the used one, the client MAY forgo sending of the Proxy-Scheme and Uri-Host option. [ This follows from multiple addresses being valid for that TCP connection; at some point we may want to say something about what that means for the default value of the Uri-Host option -- maybe something like "has the default value of any of the associated addresses, but the server may only enable MPTCP if there is implicit aliasing between all of them" (similar to OSCORE's statement)? ] [ TBD: Do we need a section analogous to this that deals with (D)TLS session resumption in absence of SNI? ]

Open Questions / further ideas This section is to be either converted into concrete guidance, or removed before submission to the IESG.

• Advertising under a stable name: If a host wants to advertise its hostname rather than its IP address during multicast, how does it best do that? Options, when answering from 2001:db8::1 to a request to ff02::fd are: ,..., ;rel=has-unique-proxy;anchor="coap://myhostname" ]]> which is verbose but formally clear, and ,..., ;rel=has-unique-proxy;anchor="coap://myhostname" ]]> which is compatible with unaware clients, but its correctness with respect to canonical URIs needs to be argued by the client, in this sequence
  • understanding the has-unique-proxy line,
  • understanding that the request that went to 2001:db8::1 was really a Proxy-Scheme/Uri-Host-elided version of a request to coap://myhostname, and then
  • processing any relative reference with this new base in mind.
  (Not that it would need to happen in software in that sequence, but that is the sequence needed to understand how the /foo here is really coap://myhostname/foo). If the he Constrained RESTful Application Language (CoRAL) is used during discovery, a base directive or reverse relation to has-unique-proxy would make this easier.

EDHOC EAD for verifying legitimate proxies This section is to be moved into another document, possibly groupcomm-proxy. This document sketches an extension to that informs the server of the public address the client is using, allowing it to detect undesired reverse proxies. [ This section is immature, and written up as a discussion starting point. Further research into prior art is still necessary. ] The External Authorization Data (EAD) item with name "Proxy CRI", label 24-CPA, is defined for use with messages 1, 2 and 3. A client can set this label in non-critical form, followed by a CRI () that is CBOR-encoded in a byte string as a CBOR sequence. The transport address indicated by the URI is the proxy the client chose from information advertised about the server. If a server cannot determine its set of legitimate proxies, it ignores the EAD item (as does any EDHOC implementation that is unaware of it). If it recognizes the CRI as belonging to a legitimate proxy, it places the empty label in its non-critical form in the next message to confirm the proxy choice. Otherwise, it places the label in its critical form, either empty or containing a recommended CRI. The client may then decide to discontinue using the proxy, or to use more extensive padding options to sidestep the attack. Both the client and the server may alert their administrators of a possible traffic misdirection. [ While using an EDHOC EAD is suitable for connection setup, such a mechanism may also be useful at a later time, e.g., to re-check a server's address after a name change; establishing an equivalent CoAP option is being considered, also in light of the discussion around https://github.com/core-wg/corrclar/pull/40 and https://github.com/core-wg/groupcomm-proxy/issues/3. ]

Literals beyond IP addresses [ This section is placed here preliminarily: After initial review in CoRE, this may be better moved into a separate document aiming for a wider IETF audience. ]

Motivation for new literal-ish names IP literals were part of URIs from the start . Initially, they were equivalent to hostnames in their expressiveness, save for their inherent difference that the former can be used without a shared resolver, and the latter can be switched to a different network address. This equivalence got lost gradually: Certificates for TLS (its precursor SSL has been available since 1995 ) have only been available practically to hostnames. The Host header established in HTTP 1.1 introduced name based virtual hosting in 1999. DNS-Based Authentication of Named Entries (DANE) , which provides TLS public keys augmenting (or even replacing) the public key infrastructure, is only available for hostnames resolved through DNSSEC. SVCB records introduced in 2023 allow starting newer HTTP transports without going through HTTP/1.1 first, enable load balancing, fail-over, and allow for Encrypted Client Hello -- again, only for hostnames resolved through DNS. This document proposes an expression for the host component of a URI that fills that gap. Note that no attempt is yet made to register service.arpa in the .ARPA Zone Management Since this document was started, RFC9665 was published with a different use of "service.arpa"; this document will be updated in a later revision to use a different proposed identifier.; that name is used only for the purpose of discussion. The structure and even more the syntax used here is highly preliminary. They serve to illustrate that the desired properties can be obtained, and do not claim to be optimal. As one of many aspects, they are missing considerations for normalization and for internationalization.

Structure of service.arpa Names under service.arpa are structured into an ordered list of key-value component pairs, and the common suffix service.arpa. These pairs represent the very items also produced by . In the current version, they can not express multiple entries with different structures. They can express different entries, but any repeated items (e.g., different ALPNs and IP addresses) only yield their Cartisian product (i.e., no "TCP on this or that address, TLS on another"). Keeping with the style of DNS (least significant component first), pairs are expressed with their data as the first label, followed by the key in a separate label. Data items ending with a "-" character are concatenated with their previous label to avoid overflowing the 63-octet limit of DNS (even though those do not wind up in DNS serialization). For example, "world.hello-.label.8080.port" contains, in that order, information about port 8080 and the label "helloworld". Initial component types are:

• 6: The value encodes an IPv6 address in format, with the colon character (":") replaced with a dash ("-"). It indicates an address of a host providing the service. If any address information is present, a client SHOULD use that information to access the service.
• 4: The value encodes an IPv4 address in dotted decimal format , with the dot character (".") replaced with a dash ("-"). It indicates an address of a host providing the service.
• tlsa: The data of a DNS TLSA record encoded in base32 . Depending on the usage, this describes TLS credentials through which the service can be authenticated. If present, a client MUST establish a secure connection, and MUST fail the connection if the TLSA record's requirements are not met.
• cred, edhoc-app-prof, edhocpath, oauth-hints: SvcParams in base32 encoding of their wire format.
• alpn: The ALPN(s) in hexadecimal encoding, separated by dashes.

Due to the rules of , all components are case insensitive and canonically lowercase. Note that while using the IPvFuture mechanism of would avoid compatibility issues around the 63 character limit and some of the character restrictions, it would not resolve the larger limitation of case insensitivity.

Processing service.arpa A client accessing a resource under a service.arpa name does not consult DNS, but obtains information equivalent to the results of a DNS query from parsing the name. DNS resolvers should refuse to resolve service.arpa names. (They would have all the information needed to produce sensible results, but operational aspects would need a lot of consideration; future versions of this document may revise this).

Examples TBD: For SvcParams, the examples are inconsistent with the base32 recommendation; they serve to explore the possible alternatives.

• http://683263.alpn.2001-db8--1.6.service.arpa/ -- The server is reachable on 2001:db8::1 using HTTP/2 (h2c is 683263 in hex)
• https://amaqckrkfivcukrkfivcukrkfivcukrkfivcukrkfivcukrkfivcukrk.tlsa.service.arpa/ -- No address information is provided, the client needs to resort to other discovery mechanisms. Any server is eligible to serve the resource if it can present a (possibly self-signed) certificate whose public key SHA256 matches the encoded value.
• coap://434f4150.alpn.2001-db8--1.6.rai3ouj4a.ueekcandaeasabbblaqlxq2jmbjg5jgtf2kazljkenaurxocc6i2ckx3zowjgy-.cred.service.arpa/ -- The server is reachable using CoAP over TCP with any security mechanism at 2001:db8::1, and the service is identifiable by the use of a KCCS credential describing an X25519 public key (which is currently only usable with EDHOC).
• coap://rai3ouj4a.ueekcandaeasabbblaqlxq2jmbjg5jgtf2kazljkenaurxocc6i2ckx3zowjgy-.cred.service.arpa/ -- The same server without any discoverability hints; it is up to the client to discover (possibly short-lived) connection opportunities to the server identified by that key.

Acknowledgements This document builds heavily on concepts explored by Bill Silverajan and Mert Ocak in , together with the work by Ines Robles and Klaus Hartke inside T2TRG. [ TBD: reviewers Marco Klaus ]