Short Distribution Chain (SDC) Workflow and New OAuth Parameters for the Authentication and Authorization for Constrained Environments (ACE) Framework

Short Distribution Chain (SDC) Workflow and New OAuth Parameters for the Authentication and Authorization for Constrained Environments (ACE) Framework RISE AB

Isafjordsgatan 22 Kista 164 40 Sweden marco.tiloca@ri.se

Ericsson AB

Torshamnsgatan 23 Kista 164 40 Sweden goran.selander@ericsson.com

Security ACE Working Group Internet-Draft The specification RFC 9200 defines the Authentication and Authorization for Constrained Environments (ACE) framework. This document updates the ACE framework and therefore RFC 9200 as follows. (1) It defines the Short Distribution Chain (SDC) workflow that the authorization server (AS) can use for uploading an access token to a resource server on behalf of the client. (2) For the OAuth 2.0 token endpoint, it defines new parameters and encodings and it extends the semantics of the "ace_profile" parameter. (3) For the OAuth 2.0 authz-info endpoint, it defines a new parameter and its encoding. (4) It defines how the client and the AS can coordinate on the exchange of the client's and resource server's public authentication credentials, when those can be transported by value or identified by reference; this extends the semantics of the "rs_cnf" parameter for the OAuth 2.0 token endpoint, thus updating RFC 9201. (5) It extends the error handling at the AS, for which it defines a new error code. (6) It deprecates the original payload format of error responses conveying an error code, when Concise Binary Object Representation (CBOR) is used to encode message payloads. For those responses, it defines a new payload format aligned with RFC 9290, thus updating in this respect also the profiles defined in RFC 9202, RFC 9203, and RFC 9431. (7) It amends two of the requirements on profiles of the framework. About This Document Status information for this document may be found at . Discussion of this document takes place on the Authentication and Authorization for Constrained Environments (ace) Working Group mailing list (), which is archived at . Subscribe at . Source for this draft and an issue tracker can be found at .

Introduction The Authentication and Authorization for Constrained Environments (ACE) framework defines an architecture to enforce access control for constrained devices. A client (C) requests an assertion of granted permissions from an authorization server (AS) in the form of an access token, then uploads the access token to the target resource server (RS), and finally accesses protected resources at the RS according to the permissions specified in the access token. The ACE framework has as main building blocks the OAuth 2.0 framework , the Constrained Application Protocol (CoAP) for message transfer, Concise Binary Object Representation (CBOR) for compact encoding, and CBOR Object Signing and Encryption (COSE) for self-contained protection of access tokens. In addition, separate profile documents define in detail how the participants in the ACE architecture communicate, especially as to the security protocols that they use. The present document updates as follows.

It defines the Short Distribution Chain (SDC) workflow for the ACE framework (see of the present document), according to which the AS uploads the access token to the RS on behalf of C and then informs C about the outcome. The SDC workflow is especially convenient in deployments where the communication leg between C and the RS is constrained, but the communication leg between the AS and the RS is not. The SDC workflow has no ambition to replace the original workflow defined in . The AS can use one workflow or the other, depending, for example, on the specific RS for which an access token has been issued and the nature of the communication leg with that RS.
It defines new parameters and encodings for the OAuth 2.0 token endpoint at the AS (see of the present document). These include:
- "token_upload", used by C to inform the AS that it opts in to use the SDC workflow and by the AS to inform C about the outcome of the token uploading to the RS per the SDC workflow.
- "token_hash", used by the AS to provide C with a token hash, which corresponds to an access token that the AS has issued for C and has successfully uploaded to the RS on behalf of C per the SDC workflow.
- "to_rs", used by C to provide the AS with information to relay to the RS, upon asking the AS to upload the access token to the RS per the SDC workflow. Its specific use with the OSCORE profile is also described, as effectively enabling the use of the SDC workflow for that profile.
- "from_rs", used by the AS to provide C with information to relay from the RS, after the AS has successfully uploaded the access token to the RS per the SDC workflow. Its specific use with the OSCORE profile is also described, as effectively enabling the use of the SDC workflow for that profile.
- "rs_cnf2", used by the AS to provide C with the public keys of the RSs in the group-audience for which the access token is issued (see ).
- "audience2", used by the AS to provide C with the identifiers of the RSs in the group-audience for which the access token is issued.
- "anchor_cnf", used by the AS to provide C with the public keys of trust anchors, which C can use to validate the public key of an RS (e.g., as provided in the "rs_cnf" parameter defined in or in the "rs_cnf2" parameter defined in the present document).
- "token_series_id", used by the AS to provide C with the binary identifier of a token series and by C to ask the AS for a new access token in the same token series that dynamically updates access rights. A corresponding access token claim, namely "token_series_id", is also defined.
- "updated_rights", used by the AS to provide the RS with an indication that an access token uploaded per the SDC workflow is not the first one of a new token series, i.e., that the AS has issued the access token for dynamically updating the access rights of C.
It extends the semantics of the "ace_profile" parameter for the OAuth 2.0 token endpoint at the authorization server defined in (see of the present document).
It defines how C and the AS can coordinate on the exchange of the client's and resource server's public authentication credentials, when those can be transported by value or identified by reference in the access token request and response (see of the present document). This extends the semantics of the "rs_cnf" parameter for the OAuth 2.0 token endpoint defined in . Therefore, it updates .
It extends the error handling at the AS, for which it defines a new error code that the AS can use for error responses sent to the client, after failing to verify the proof of possession of the client's private key when processing an access token request (see of the present document).
It deprecates the original payload format of error responses that convey an error code, when CBOR is used to encode message payloads in the ACE framework. For such error responses, it defines a new payload format according to the problem-details format specified in (see of the present document). In this respect, it also updates the profiles of the ACE framework defined in , , and .
It amends two of the requirements on profiles of the ACE framework originally compiled in (see of the present document).

Terminology The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP 14 when, and only when, they appear in all capitals, as shown here. Readers are expected to be familiar with the terms and concepts related to the ACE framework for Authentication and Authorization , as well as with terms and concepts related to CBOR Web Tokens (CWTs) and CWT Confirmation Methods . The terminology for entities in the considered architecture is defined in OAuth 2.0 . In particular, this includes client (C), resource server (RS), and authorization server (AS). Readers are also expected to be familiar with the terms and concepts related to CoAP , Concise Data Definition Language (CDDL) , CBOR , JavaScript Object Notation (JSON) , and COSE . Note that the term "endpoint" is used here following its OAuth definition , aimed at denoting resources such as /token and /introspect at the AS, and /authz-info at the RS. The CoAP definition, which is "[a]n entity participating in the CoAP protocol" , is not used in this document. Furthermore, this document uses the following terms.

Token series: a set of access tokens, all of which are bound to the same proof-of-possession (PoP) key and are sequentially issued by the same AS for the same pair (client, audience) per the same profile of ACE. A token series ends when the latest access token of that token series becomes invalid (e.g., when it expires or gets revoked). Profiles of ACE can provide their extended and specialized definition, e.g., by further taking into account the public authentication credentials of C and the RS.
Token hash: identifier of an access token, in binary format encoding. The token hash has no relation with other access token identifiers possibly used, such as the 'cti' (CWT ID) claim of CWTs .

This document uses the acronym LAKE, expanded to Lightweight Authenticated Key Exchange, to denote the protocol specified as EDHOC in . Identifiers defined literally in or in IANA registries (e.g., the names of the EDHOC registries themselves) are unchanged.

Notations CBOR and CDDL are used in this document. Examples throughout this document are expressed in CBOR diagnostic notation as defined in and . Diagnostic notation comments are often used to provide a textual representation of the parameters' keys and values. In the CBOR diagnostic notation used in this document, constructs of the form e'SOME_NAME' are replaced by the value assigned to SOME_NAME in the CDDL model shown in of . For example, {e'audience2' : ["rs1", "rs2"]} stands for {54 : ["rs1", "rs2"]}. Note to RFC Editor: Please delete the paragraph immediately preceding this note. Also, in the CBOR diagnostic notation used in this document, please replace the constructs of the form e'SOME_NAME' with the value assigned to SOME_NAME in the CDDL model shown in of . Finally, please delete this note.

The Short Distribution Chain (SDC) Workflow As defined in , the ACE framework relies on its basic protocol workflow shown in . That is, the client first sends an access token request to the token endpoint at the AS (Step A), specifying permissions that it seeks to obtain for accessing protected resources at the RS, possibly together with information on its own public authentication credential. Then, if the request is successfully verified, authenticated, and authorized, the AS replies to the client with an access token response (Step B), providing an access token and possibly additional parameters as access information including the actually granted permissions. Finally, the client uploads the access token to the RS and, consistent with the permissions granted according to the access token, accesses a resource at the RS (Step C), which replies with the result of the resource access (Step F). Details about what protocol the client and the RS use to establish a secure association, mutually authenticate, and secure their communications are defined in the specific profile of ACE used, such as , , , , or . Further interactions are possible between the AS and the RS, i.e., the exchange of an introspection request and response where the AS validates a previously issued access token for the RS (Steps D and E).

ACE Basic Protocol Workflow. | | | | | Authorization | | |<--(B)-- Access Token ---------| Server | | | + Access Information | | | | + Refresh Token (optional) +---------------+ | | ^ | | | Introspection Request (D)| | | Client | Response | |(E) | | (optional exchange) | | | | | v | | +--------------+ | |---(C)-- Token + Request ----->| | | | | Resource | | |<--(F)-- Protected Resource ---| Server | | | | | +--------+ +--------------+ ]]> This section defines the alternative Short Distribution Chain (SDC) workflow shown in , which MAY be supported by the AS. Unlike in the original workflow defined in , the AS uploads the access token to the RS on behalf of the client and then informs the client about the outcome. If the token uploading has been successfully completed, the client typically does not need to obtain the access token from the AS altogether. That is, the client simply establishes a secure association with the RS (if that has not happened already) and then accesses protected resources at the RS, according to the permissions granted per the access token and specified by the AS as access information.

ACE Short Distribution Chain (SDC) Workflow. | | | | | Authorization | | |<--(B)-- Token Response -------| Server | | | + Access Information | | | | + Access Token (optional) +----------------------------+ | | + Refresh Token (optional) ^ | | ^ | | | | | | Token-Upload | | Introspection Request (D)| | (A1)| | Request | Client | Response | |(E) | |(A2) Response | | (optional exchange) | | | | | | | v v | | | +----------------------------+ | |---(C1)-- Token (Optional) --->| | | | | | | |---(C2)-- Protected Request -->| Resource | | | | Server | | |<--(F)--- Protected Resource --| | | | | | +--------+ +----------------------------+ ]]> More specifically, the SDC workflow consists of the following steps.

Step A - Like in the original workflow, the client sends an access token request to the token endpoint at the AS, with the additional indication that it opts in to use the SDC workflow. As defined in , this indication is provided to the AS by means of the "token_upload" parameter included in the access token request. The parameter also specifies what the AS has to return in the access token response at Step B, following a successful uploading of the access token from the AS to the RS.
Step A1 - This new step consists of the AS uploading the access token to the RS, typically at the authz-info endpoint, just like the client does in the original workflow.
Step A2 - This new step consists of the RS replying to the AS, following the uploading of the access token at Step A1.
Step B - In the access token response, the AS informs the client that it has attempted to upload the access token to the RS, specifying the outcome of the token uploading based on the reply received from the RS at Step A2. As defined in , this information is provided to the client by means of the "token_upload" parameter included in the access token response. If the token uploading has failed, the access token response also includes the access token. Otherwise, the access token response includes information consistent with what was specified by the "token_upload" parameter of the access token request at Step A.
Step C1 - This step occurs if the token uploading from the AS has failed, and the AS has provided the client with the access token at Step B. In such a case, the client uploads the access token to the RS just like at Step C of the original workflow.
Step C2 - The client attempts to access a protected resource at the RS, according to the permissions granted per the access token and specified by the AS as access information at Step B.
Steps D, E, and F are like in the original workflow.

The SDC workflow has no ambition to replace the original workflow defined in . The AS can use one workflow or the other, depending, for example, on the specific RS for which the access token has been issued and the nature of the communication leg with that RS. When using the SDC workflow, all the communications between the AS and the RS MUST be protected, consistent with Sections and of . Unlike in the original workflow, this results in protecting also the uploading of the first access token in a token series, i.e., in addition to the uploading of the following access tokens in the token series for dynamically updating the access rights of the client. The SDC workflow is also suitable for deployments where clients are not aware of details such as the need for access tokens to be issued by the AS and uploaded at the RS. Consistent with the intended access policies, the AS can be configured to automatically issue access tokens for such clients and upload those access tokens to the RS. This means that such clients do not have to request for an access token to be issued in the first place. That is, they can immediately send requests to the RS for accessing its protected resources, in accordance with the access tokens already issued and uploaded by the AS.

Token Upload When using the original workflow defined in , there are two typical cases concerning the upload of the access token to the RS from C.

The first case consists in the upload of the first access token in a token series. While details depend on the specific profile of ACE used, such an access token is typically uploaded through an unprotected POST request to the authz-info endpoint.
The second case consists in the upload of an access token that is not the first of its token series, i.e., the AS has issued the access token for dynamically updating the access rights of C. The intent is also for C and the RS to preserve the same secure communication association that they currently share and that is associated with the token series in question. Such an access token is uploaded through a POST request to the authz-info endpoint, which is protected by means of the secure communication association that is shared between C and the RS. If the new access token is accepted by the RS, the new access token supersedes the one currently stored for the token series in question, and it becomes associated with the corresponding secure communication association that is shared between C and the RS.

However, if the AS uploads the access token to the RS on behalf of C as per the SDC workflow, the upload of the access token always rely on a protected POST request from the AS to the authz-info endpoint. In particular, the request is protected with the secure communication association shared between the AS and the RS. When receiving a POST request to the authz-info endpoint that is specifically protected through the secure communication association shared with the AS, the RS proceeds as follows. In particular, the RS leverages the explicit indication provided by the AS through the "updated_rights" parameter defined in , which is included in the request in the case of dynamic update of access rights.

If the POST request does not include the "updated_rights" parameter, the access token in question is the first one in a token series. Consequently, the RS processes the request and the access token therein like it would when receiving the request from C and according to the specific profile of ACE used.
If the POST request includes the "updated_rights" parameter encoding a specific value, the access token in question is not the first one in a token series, i.e., it is meant to dynamically update the access rights of C, while preserving the same secure communication association that is shared between C and the RS. The POST request and its processing at the RS in this case are defined in .

New Parameters The rest of this section defines a number of additional parameters and encodings for the OAuth 2.0 token endpoint at the AS (see ) and for the OAuth 2.0 authz-info endpoint at the RS (see ).

token_upload This section defines the additional "token_upload" parameter. The parameter can be used in an access token request sent by C to the token endpoint at the AS (see ), as well as in the access token response sent as a reply by the AS (see ).

In the Access Token Request The "token_upload" parameter is OPTIONAL to include in an access token request. The presence of this parameter indicates that C opts in to use the SDC workflow defined in , whose actual use for uploading the issued access token to the RS is an exclusive prerogative of the AS. This parameter can take one of the following integer values. When the access token request is encoded in CBOR, those values are encoded as CBOR unsigned integers. The value of the parameter determines whether the follow-up access token response will have to include certain information, in the case that the AS has successfully uploaded the issued access token to the RS.

0: The access token response will have to include neither the access token nor its corresponding token hash. Note that it is not useful to specify the value 0 if C wishes to use the method defined in for receiving notifications about revoked access tokens from the AS. In such case, C needs to specify one of the two alternative values 1 or 2 defined below.
1: The access token response will have to include the token hash corresponding to the access token, but not the access token.
2: The access token response will have to include the access token, but not the corresponding token hash.

If the AS supports the SDC workflow and the access token request includes the "token_upload" parameter with value 0, 1, or 2, then the AS MAY use the SDC workflow to upload the access token to the RS on behalf of C. Otherwise, following that access token request, the AS MUST NOT use the SDC workflow.

In the Access Token Response The "token_upload" parameter MUST be included in an access token response, if both the following conditions apply. Otherwise, the "token_upload" parameter MUST NOT be included.

The corresponding access token request from C included the "token_upload" parameter, with value 0, 1, or 2.
The AS has attempted to upload an access token to the RS as per the SDC workflow, irrespective of the result of the token upload.

The following considers three possible cases, with reference to the issued access token pertaining to the access token response:

CASE_1 - The issued access token is the first one of a new token series, aligned with the access token request that asked to issue the first access token of a new token series.
CASE_2 - The issued access token is not the first one in a token series, aligned with the access token request that asked to dynamically update the access rights of C, i.e., to issue a new access token of an existing token series. further describes this case.
CASE_3 - The issued access token is the first one of a new token series, although the access token request asked to dynamically update the access rights of C, i.e., to issue a new access token of an existing token series. The new token series to which the issued access token belongs is created by the AS "on the fly", when receiving the specific error code "missing_old_token" from the RS (see and ), after uploading an access token intended for updating the access rights of C as indicated in the access token request. In this case, the AS does not upload the issued access token at the RS, and it provides the access token to C in the access token response. further describes this case.

When the "token_upload" parameter is included in the access token response, it can take one of the following integer values. When the access token response is encoded in CBOR, those values are encoded as CBOR unsigned integers.

If CASE_1 or CASE_2 applies and the token upload at the RS was successful, then the "token_upload" parameter MUST encode the value 0.
If CASE_1 or CASE_2 applies and the token upload at the RS was not successful, then the "token_upload" parameter MUST encode the value 1.
If CASE_3 applies, then the "token_upload" parameter MUST encode the value 2.

When the access token targets a group-audience (see ), the same as above holds, with the following differences:

If CASE_1 or CASE_2 applies, the access token response includes the "token_upload" parameter encoding the value 0 and thus indicates that the token upload was successful, if and only if the token upload was successful at each RS in the group-audience.
In the case that the token upload fails at an RS in the group-audience, the AS MUST continue uploading the access token at the remaining RSs in the group-audience, with the following exception: if the access token is uploaded together with the "updated_rights" parameter (see ) and the token upload fails with the AS receiving an error response that includes the error code "missing_old_token" (see and ), then the AS MUST NOT upload the access token to any remaining RS in the group-audience and it creates a new token series "on the fly" (see ), i.e., CASE_3 applies.

In the case that the "token_upload" parameter encodes the value 1 or 2, the access token response MUST include the "access_token" parameter specifying the issued access token. Instead, in the case that the "token_upload" parameter encodes the value 0, the access token response can include additional parameters as defined below, depending on the value of the "token_upload" parameter in the corresponding access token request:

If the "token_upload" parameter in the access token request specified the value 0, then the access token response MUST NOT include the "access_token" parameter and MUST NOT include the "token_hash" parameter defined in .
If the "token_upload" parameter in the access token request specified the value 1, then the access token response MUST NOT include the "access_token" parameter and MUST include the "token_hash" parameter defined in , specifying the hash corresponding to the issued access token and computed as defined in .
If the "token_upload" parameter in the access token request specified the value 2, then the access token response MUST include the "access_token" parameter specifying the issued access token and MUST NOT include the "token_hash" parameter defined in .

When C receives an access token response that includes the "token_upload" parameter encoding the value 2 (see ), the AS is explicitly telling C that:

The dynamic update of access rights that was asked through the access token request did not succeed.
The RS does not store an old access token belonging to the token series that C asked to extend. Profiles of ACE typically prescribe that, in such case, the RS does not have anymore the secure communication association that was previously shared with C and bound to such old access token.
The issued access token is the first one of a new token series.

Consequently, C takes the next steps with the RS according to the profile of ACE used, e.g., C establishes a secure communication association with the RS and bound to the issued access token of the new token series. When the access token targets a group-audience, the RS that does not store an old access token is the RS that replied to the AS with an error response including the error code "missing_old_token", which results in the AS creating a new token series "on the fly" (see above). In such case, C takes the next steps with all the RSs in the group-audience according to the profile of ACE used, e.g., C establishes a secure communication association with each RS in the group-audience and bound to the issued access token of the new token series.

Examples shows an example, with first an access token request from C to the AS and then an access token response from the AS to C, following the issue of an access token bound to a symmetric PoP key. The access token request specifies the "token_upload" parameter with value 0. That is, C indicates that it requires neither the access token nor the corresponding token hash from the AS, in the case that the AS successfully uploads the access token to the RS. The access token response specifies the "token_upload" parameter with value 0, which indicates that the AS has successfully uploaded the access token to the RS on behalf of C. Consistent with the value of the "token_upload" parameter in the access token request, the access token response includes neither the access token nor its corresponding token hash. The access token response also includes the "cnf" parameter specifying the symmetric PoP key bound to the access token.

Example of Access Token Request-Response Exchange. Following a successful uploading of the access token from the AS to the RS, the access token response includes the "token_upload" parameter but not the access token, which is bound to a symmetric key and was uploaded to the RS by the AS. shows another example, with first an access token request from C to the AS and then an access token response from the AS to C, also following the issue of an access token bound to a symmetric PoP key. The access token request specifies the "token_upload" parameter with value 2. That is, C indicates that it requires the access token from the AS, even in the case that the AS successfully uploads the access token to the RS. The access token response specifies the "token_upload" parameter with value 0, which indicates that the AS has successfully uploaded the access token to the RS on behalf of C. Consistent with the value of the "token_upload" parameter in the access token request, the access token response includes the "access_token" parameter specifying the issued access token. The access token response also includes the "cnf" parameter specifying the symmetric PoP key bound to the access token.

Example of Access Token Request-Response Exchange. Following a successful uploading of the access token from the AS to the RS, the access token response includes the "token_upload" parameter as well as the "access_token" parameter conveying the access token, which is bound to a symmetric key and was uploaded to the RS by the AS. shows another example, with first an access token request from C to the AS and then an access token response from the AS to C, also following the issue of an access token bound to a symmetric PoP key. The access token request specifies the "token_upload" parameter with value 0. That is, C indicates that it requires neither the access token nor the corresponding token hash from the AS, in the case that the AS successfully uploads the access token to the RS. In this example, the access token response includes the "token_upload" parameter with value 1, which indicates that the AS has attempted and failed to upload the access token to the RS on behalf of C. The access token response also includes the "access_token" parameter specifying the issued access token, together with the "cnf" parameter specifying the symmetric PoP key bound to the access token. Note that, even though the AS has failed to upload the access token to the RS, the response code 2.01 (Created) is used when replying to C, since the access token request as such has been successfully processed at the AS, with the following issue of the access token.

Example of Access Token Request-Response Exchange. Following a failed uploading of the access token from the AS to the RS, the access token response includes the "token_upload" parameter with value 1 as well the "access_token" parameter conveying the access token bound to a symmetric key.

token_hash This section defines the additional "token_hash" parameter. The parameter can be used in an access token response sent by the AS (see ), in reply to an access token request sent to the token endpoint by C. The following refers to the base64url encoding without padding (see ) and denotes as "binary representation" of a text string the corresponding UTF-8 encoding , which is the implied charset used in JSON (see ). The "token_hash" parameter MUST be included in an access token response, if both the following conditions apply. Otherwise, it MUST NOT be included.

The corresponding access token request included the "token_upload" parameter with value 1 (see ).
The access token response includes the "token_upload" parameter with value 0 (see ). That is, the AS has successfully uploaded the issued access token to the RS, as per the SDC workflow.

This parameter specifies the token hash corresponding to the access token issued by the AS and successfully uploaded to the RS on behalf of C. In particular:

If the access token response is encoded in CBOR, then the "token_hash" parameter is a CBOR byte string, with value the token hash.
If the access token response is encoded in JSON, then the "token_hash" parameter has as value the base64url-encoded text string that encodes the token hash.

The AS computes the token hash as defined in .

Computing the Token Hash The AS computes the token hash over the value that the "access_token" parameter would have had in the same access token response, if it was included therein and specifying the access token. In particular, the input HASH_INPUT over which the token hash is computed is determined as follows.

If the access token response is encoded in CBOR, then:
- BYTES denotes the value of the CBOR byte string that would be conveyed by the "access_token" parameter, if this was included in the access token response.
- HASH_INPUT_TEXT is the base64url-encoded text string that encodes BYTES.
- HASH_INPUT is the binary representation of HASH_INPUT_TEXT.
If the access token response is encoded in JSON, then HASH_INPUT is the binary representation of the text string that would be conveyed by the "access_token" parameter, if this was included in the access token response.

Once determined HASH_INPUT as defined above, a hash value of HASH_INPUT is generated as per . The resulting output in binary format is used as the token hash. Note that the used binary format embeds the identifier of the used hash function in the first byte of the computed token hash. The specific hash function used MUST be collision resistant on byte strings and MUST be selected from the "Named Information Hash Algorithm Registry" . Consistent with the compliance requirements in , the hash function sha-256 as specified in is mandatory to implement. The computation of token hashes defined above is aligned with that specified for the computation of token hashes in , where they are used as identifiers of revoked access tokens. Therefore, given a hash algorithm and an access token, the AS computes the same corresponding token hash in either case. If the AS supports the method specified in , then the AS MUST use the same hash algorithm for computing both the token hashes to include in the "token_hash" parameter and the token hashes computed per that method to identify revoked access tokens.

Example shows an example, with first an access token request from C to the AS and then an access token response from the AS to C, following the issue of an access token bound to a symmetric PoP key. The access token request specifies the "token_upload" parameter with value 1. That is, C indicates that it requires the token hash corresponding to the access token from the AS, in the case that the AS successfully uploads the access token to the RS. The access token response specifies the "token_upload" parameter with value 0, which indicates that the AS has successfully uploaded the access token to the RS on behalf of C. Consistent with the value of the "token_upload" parameter in the access token request, the access token response includes the "token_hash" parameter, which specifies the token hash corresponding to the issued access token. The access token response also includes the "cnf" parameter specifying the symmetric PoP key bound to the access token.

Example of Access Token Request-Response Exchange. Following a successful uploading of the access token from the AS to the RS, the access token response includes the "token_upload" parameter as well as the "token_hash" parameter. The "token_hash" parameter conveys the token hash corresponding to the issued access token, which is bound to a symmetric key and was uploaded to the RS by the AS.

to_rs and from_rs The rest of this section defines the additional parameters "to_rs" (see ) and "from_rs" (see ). The "to_rs" parameter can be used in an access token request sent by C to the token endpoint at the AS (see ). The "from_rs" parameter can be used in an access token response sent by the AS (see ), in reply to an access token request sent to the token endpoint by C. The semantics and encoding of the information specified in the two parameters depend on the specific profile of ACE and application used. For instance, when using the OSCORE profile , C and RS can use the two parameters to exchange the expected nonces and identifiers via the AS. describes how the two parameters are used when the OSCORE profile is used, thereby effectively enabling the use of the SDC workflow for that profile.

to_rs The "to_rs" parameter is OPTIONAL to include in an access token request. The presence of this parameter indicates that C wishes the AS to relay the information specified therein to the RS, when the AS uploads the issued access token to the RS per the SDC workflow defined in . The "to_rs" parameter MUST NOT be included if the "token_upload" parameter defined in is not included in the access token request. Also, this parameter MUST NOT be included if the requested access token is not the first one of a new token series, i.e., if C is asking the AS for a new access token in the same token series that dynamically updates access rights. The information specified in the "to_rs" parameter consists in what C would provide to the RS in addition to the access token, if the original workflow was used and a POST request encoded in CBOR was sent to the authz-info endpoint at the RS. When composing the parameter "to_rs", C considers the same information and MUST wrap it in a data structure STRUCT, by using the same method that it employs when using the original workflow. For example, with reference to the OSCORE profile of ACE , such a method composes STRUCT as a CBOR map, which has to be sent as payload of a request with Content-Format "application/ace+cbor". After that, C builds a CBOR byte string STR, whose value is the binary representation of STRUCT. If and only if the request to the authz-info endpoint has to be sent with a Content-Format ct different from the one employed in the profile of ACE used, then C MUST tag the CBOR byte string STR (see ). The tag number TN MUST be the one associated with the Content-Format ct and is determined according to the technique described in . For example, the Content-Format "application/ace+cbor" has Content-Format ID 19 and therefore has 1668546836 as its associated tag number. When the access token request is encoded in CBOR, the value of the "to_rs" parameter is the (tagged) CBOR byte string STR. When the access token request is encoded in JSON, the value of the "to_rs" parameter is a text string, which encodes the binary representation of the (tagged) CBOR byte string STR in base64url without padding (see ). If the "to_rs" parameter is included, the AS proceeds as follows when composing the POST request to send to the authz-info endpoint on behalf of C:

The AS sets the Content-Format of the request to be either:
- the one employed in the profile of ACE used, if the CBOR byte string STR conveyed by the "to_rs" parameter is not tagged; or, otherwise,
- the one associated with the tag number TN of the tagged CBOR byte string STR conveyed by the "to_rs" parameter.
The AS retrieves the structure STRUCT from STR and extends STRUCT by adding the issued access token, consistent with the profile of ACE used and the Content-Format determined at the previous step. For example, when using the OSCORE profile of ACE and thus the Content-Format to use is "application/ace+cbor", STRUCT is a CBOR map and the access token is included therein as an entry that has: as map key, 1 encoded as a CBOR integer; as map value, a CBOR byte string whose value is the binary representation of the access token.

Clearly, performing the two steps above requires the AS to understand the structure STRUCT and its semantics. In turn, such an understanding builds on the AS supporting the profile of ACE used and the Content-Format to use as determined at Step 1. In the expected cases, the AS is realistically able to perform the two steps. If the AS finds itself unable to perform the two steps, then the AS would simply not upload the access token to the RS on behalf of C. In such a case, the AS replies to C with an access token response, which includes the "access_token" parameter specifying the issued access token and does not include the "token_upload" parameter (see ). Tagging the CBOR byte string as defined above ensures that the AS can relay the information specified in the "to_rs" parameter as intended by C, i.e., by sending to the authz-info endpoint a POST request that has the correct Content-Format and conveys the correct payload. As a case in point, using the DTLS profile of ACE typically results in a POST request to the authz-info endpoint with Content-Format "application/cwt", as per . However, the DTLS profile of ACE can be combined with application profiles of . In such a case, the POST request might convey both the access token and additional parameters from C (e.g., "sign_info" defined in ), which requires the request to have Content-Format "application/ace+cbor" (see ).

from_rs The "from_rs" parameter is OPTIONAL to include in an access token response. The presence of this parameter indicates that the AS is relaying the information specified therein to C, which the AS has received from the RS after having successfully uploaded the access token to the RS per the SDC workflow defined in . The "from_rs" parameter MUST be included in an access token response if both the following conditions apply. Otherwise, it MUST NOT be included.

The corresponding access token request included the "token_upload" parameter (see ).
The access token response includes the "token_upload" parameter with value 0 (see ). That is, the AS has successfully uploaded the issued access token to the RS, as per the SDC workflow.

The information specified in the "from_rs" parameter consists in what C would receive from the RS, if the original workflow was used and the RS sent a successful response encoded in CBOR, in reply to a POST request to the authz-info endpoint. When composing the parameter "from_rs", the AS builds a CBOR byte string STR as follows:

If the successful response from the authz-info endpoint does not include a payload, then STR is the empty CBOR byte string (0x40); otherwise,
The value of STR is the payload of the successful response from the authz-info endpoint. If and only if the response specifies a given Content-Format ct (i.e., by means of the CoAP Content-Format Option), then the AS MUST tag the CBOR byte string STR (see ). The tag number TN MUST be the one associated with the Content-Format ct and is determined according to the technique described in .

When the access token response is encoded in CBOR, the value of the "from_rs" parameter is the (tagged) CBOR byte string STR. When the access token response is encoded in JSON, the value of the "from_rs" parameter is a text string, which encodes the binary representation of the (tagged) CBOR byte string STR in base64url without padding (see ). When C receives from the AS the access token response specifying the "token_upload" parameter with value 0, C retrieves from the "from_rs" parameter the information relayed by the AS, just like when retrieving that information from a successful response with Content-Format ct that C receives from the RS when using the original workflow. In particular, if the CBOR byte string STR is not the empty CBOR byte string (0x40), C considers as the Content-Format ct either:

the one employed in the profile of ACE used, if the CBOR byte string STR conveyed by the "from_rs" parameter is not tagged; or, otherwise,
the one associated with the tag number TN of the tagged CBOR byte string STR conveyed by the "from_rs" parameter.

Use with the OSCORE Profile This section describes how to use the parameters "to_rs" and "from_rs" when the OSCORE profile of ACE is used. Within the access token request from C to the AS, the value of the "to_rs" parameter is a CBOR byte string, whose value is the binary representation of a CBOR map C_MAP composed of two fields:

A field with the CBOR integer 40 as map key and with value the nonce N1 generated by C, encoded as a CBOR byte string (see ).
A field with the CBOR integer 43 as map key and with value the Recipient ID ID1 generated by C, encoded as a CBOR byte string (see ).

When building the POST request for uploading the access token to the authz-info endpoint at the RS, the AS sets the Content-Format of the request to "application/ace+cbor" and composes the request payload as specified in . In particular, the CBOR map specified as payload includes:

The "access_token" field, with value the access token to upload encoded as a CBOR byte string and with the CBOR integer 1 as map key.
The "nonce1" field, with value the same CBOR byte string specified by the field of C_MAP that has the CBOR integer 40 as map key.
The "ace_client_recipientid" field, with value the same CBOR byte string specified by the field of C_MAP that has the CBOR integer 43 as map key.

If the upload of the access token to the RS from the AS is successful, the RS replies to the AS with a 2.01 (Created) response, which has Content-Format "application/ace+cbor" and whose payload is a CBOR map RS_MAP that includes:

The "nonce2" field, with value the nonce N2 generated by the RS, encoded as a CBOR byte string (see ).
The "ace_server_recipientid" field, with value the Recipient ID ID2 generated by the RS, encoded as a CBOR byte string (see ).

Within the access token response from the AS to C, the value of the "from_rs" parameter is a CBOR byte string, whose value is the binary representation of a CBOR map composed of two elements:

A field with the CBOR integer 42 as map key and with value the same CBOR byte string specified by the "nonce2" field of RS_MAP.
A field with the CBOR integer 44 as map key and with value the same CBOR byte string specified by the "ace_server_recipientid" field of RS_MAP.

When C receives from the AS the access token response specifying the "token_upload" parameter with value 0, C retrieves the nonce N2 and the Recipient ID ID2 from the "from_rs" parameter, just like when retrieving those from the payload of a 2.01 (Created) response received from the RS when using the original workflow. shows an example where the OSCORE profile is used, with first an access token request from C to the AS and then an access token response from the AS to C, following the issue of an access token bound to a symmetric PoP key. The access token request specifies the "token_upload" parameter with value 0. That is, C indicates that it requires neither the access token nor the corresponding token hash from the AS, in the case that the AS successfully uploads the access token to the RS. Also, the access token request includes the "to_rs" parameter, specifying the values of N1 = 0x018a278f7faab55a and ID1 = 0x1645 intended to the RS. The access token response specifies the "token_upload" parameter with value 0, which indicates that the AS has successfully uploaded the access token to the RS on behalf of C. Consistent with the value of the "token_upload" parameter in the access token request, the access token response includes neither the access token nor its corresponding token hash. The access token response also includes the "cnf" parameter specifying the symmetric PoP key bound to the access token, as an OSCORE_Input_Material object (see ). Also, the access token response includes the "from_rs" parameter, specifying the values of N2 = 0x25a8991cd700ac01 and ID2 = 0x0000 received from the RS and intended to C.

Example of Access Token Request-Response Exchange where the OSCORE Profile is Used. Following a successful uploading of the access token from the AS to the RS, the access token response includes the "token_upload" parameter but not the access token, which is bound to a symmetric key and was uploaded to the RS by the AS. C and the RS exchange N1, ID1, N2, and ID2 via the AS by means of the parameters "to_rs" and "from_rs".

rs_cnf2 and audience2 This section defines the additional parameters "rs_cnf2" and "audience2". The two parameters can be used in an access token response sent by the AS (see ), in reply to an access token request sent to the token endpoint by C.

The "rs_cnf2" parameter is OPTIONAL to include in an access token response, if the token type is "pop", asymmetric keys are used, and the access token is issued for an audience that includes multiple RSs (i.e., a group-audience, see ). Otherwise, the "rs_cnf2" parameter MUST NOT be included. Also, the "rs_cnf2" parameter MUST NOT be included if the issued access token is not the first one of a new token series. This parameter specifies information about the public keys used by the RSs of the group-audience for authenticating themselves to C. It is used in the case that the binding between the public keys and the corresponding RS identities are not established through other means. If this parameter is absent, either the RSs in the group-audience do not use a public key, or the AS knows that the RSs can authenticate themselves to C without additional information. If included, this parameter MUST encode a non-empty array of N elements, where N is the number of RSs in the group-audience for which the access token is issued. The array is encoded as a CBOR array or a JSON array, depending on whether the access token response is encoded in CBOR or JSON, respectively. Each element of the array specifies the public key of an RS in the group-audience, and it MUST follow the syntax and semantics of the "cnf" claim either from for CBOR-based interactions, or from for JSON-based interactions. It is not required that all the elements of the array rely on the same confirmation method. Any of the public keys may be provided together with information such as the public key algorithm and use (e.g., specified by means of the parameters "alg" and "key_ops" in a COSE_Key structure). If such information is specified, a client MUST NOT use a public key that is incompatible with the profile of ACE used or with the PoP algorithm according to that information. An RS MUST reject a proof of possession that relies on such a key and MUST reply with a response code equivalent to the CoAP code 4.00 (Bad Request).
The "audience2" parameter is OPTIONAL to include in an access token response, and it specifies the identifiers of the RSs in the group-audience for which the access token is issued. The "audience2" parameter MUST NOT be included if the issued access token is not the first one of a new token series. If included, this parameter MUST encode a non-empty array of N elements, where N is the number of RSs in the group-audience for which the access token is issued. The array is encoded as a CBOR array or a JSON array, depending on whether the access token response is encoded in CBOR or JSON, respectively. Each element of the array in the "audience2" parameter specifies the identifier of an RS in the group-audience. The value of each element of the array is encoded as a CBOR text string or a JSON string, depending on whether the access token response is encoded in CBOR or JSON, respectively. The element of the array referring to an RS in the group-audience SHOULD have the same value that would be used to identify that RS through the "audience" parameter of an access token request to the AS (see ) and of an access token response from the AS (see ), when requesting and issuing an access token for that individual RS. The "audience2" parameter MUST be included if the "rs_cnf2" parameter is included. In such a case, the i-th element of the array in the "audience2" parameter MUST be the identifier of the RS whose public key is specified by the i-th element of the array in the "rs_cnf2" parameter.

Example shows an example of access token response from the AS to C, following the issue of an access token for a group-audience composed of two RSs, namely "rs1" and "rs2", and bound to C's public key as an asymmetric PoP key. The access token response includes the access token as well as the parameters "audience2" and "rs_cnf2". These parameters specify the public keys of the two RSs as the intended recipients of the access token and the identifiers of those two RSs, respectively.

Example of access token response with an access token bound to an asymmetric key, using the parameters "audience2" and "rs_cnf2".

anchor_cnf This section defines the additional "anchor_cnf" parameter. The parameter can be used in an access token response sent by the AS (see ), in reply to an access token request sent to the token endpoint by C. The "anchor_cnf" parameter is OPTIONAL to include in an access token response, if the token type is "pop" and asymmetric keys are used. Otherwise, the "anchor_cnf" parameter MUST NOT be included. Also, the "anchor_cnf" parameter MUST NOT be included if the issued access token is not the first one of a new token series. This parameter specifies information about the public keys of trust anchors, which C can use to validate the public key of the RS/RSs included in the audience for which the access token is issued. This parameter can be used when the access token is issued for an audience including one RS or multiple RSs. If this parameter is absent, either the RS/RSs in the audience do not use a public key, or the AS knows that C can validate the public key of such RS/RSs without additional information (e.g., C has already obtained the required public keys of the involved trust anchors from the AS or through other means). If included, this parameter MUST encode a non-empty array that MUST be treated as a set, i.e., the order of its elements has no meaning. Each element of the array specifies the public key of one trust anchor, which can be used to validate the public key of at least one RS included in the audience for which the access token is issued. The array is encoded as a CBOR array or a JSON array, depending on whether the access token response is encoded in CBOR or JSON, respectively. Each element of the array MUST follow the syntax and semantics of the "cnf" claim either from for CBOR-based interactions, or from for JSON-based interactions. It is not required that all the elements of the array rely on the same confirmation method. Any of the public keys conveyed in the "anchor_cnf" parameter may be provided together with information such as the public key algorithm and use (e.g., specified by means of the parameters "alg" and "key_ops" in a COSE_Key structure). If such information is specified, a client MUST NOT use a public key that is incompatible with the profile of ACE used or with the public keys to validate and the way to validate those. The presence of this parameter does not require that the access token response also includes the "rs_cnf" parameter defined in or the "rs_cnf2" parameter defined in of the present document. That is, C may be able to obtain the public keys of the RS/RSs for which the access token is issued through other means. When the access token response includes both the "anchor_cnf" parameter and the "audience2" parameter defined in , then C MUST make sure that a public key PK_RS is associated with an RS identified by an element of "audience2", before using any of the public keys specified in "anchor_cnf" to validate PK_RS. The particular way that C uses to verify such an association as well as the particular relationships between the identifiers of group-audiences and the identifiers of RSs specified in the "audience2" parameter are application specific. When the access token response includes the "anchor_cnf" parameter but not the "audience2" parameter, then C can use any of the public keys specified in "anchor_cnf" to validate the public key PK_RS of any RS in the targeted audience. This allows C to use the access token with an RS that is deployed later on as part of the same audience, which is particularly useful in the case of a group-audience. Specifically when the access token is issued for a group-audience G_Aud and the access token response includes the "anchor_cnf" parameter but not the "audience2" parameter, the following applies in order to prevent C from erroneously believing that G_Aud includes a given RS that is not included therein. Unless a public key PK_Anchor specified within the "anchor_cnf" parameter comprises or is accompanied by information about the RSs included in G_Aud, PK_Anchor MUST be uniquely associated with G_Aud. In particular, PK_Anchor MUST NOT be usable to successfully validate the public key of an RS that is not included in G_Aud.

Example shows an example of access token response from the AS to C, following the issue of an access token for a group-audience and bound to C's public key as an asymmetric PoP key. The identifier of the group-audience was specified by the "audience" parameter of the access token request to the AS, is specified by the "aud" claim of the issued access token, and is not repeated in the access token response from the AS. The access token response includes the "anchor_cnf" parameter. This specifies the public key of a trust anchor that C can use to validate the public keys of any RS with which the access token is going to be used. By means of the CWT confirmation method "x5chain" defined in , the public key of the trust anchor is here conveyed within an X.509 certificate used as the public authentication credential for that trust anchor.

Example of Access Token Response with an access token bound to an asymmetric key, using the "anchor_cnf" parameter.

token_series_id This section defines the additional "token_series_id" parameter. The parameter can be used in an access token request sent by C to the token endpoint at the AS (see ), as well as in the access token response sent as a reply by the AS (see ). The following refers to the base64url encoding without padding (see ).

The "token_series_id" parameter is OPTIONAL to include in an access token request. The presence of this parameter indicates that C wishes to obtain a new access token for dynamically updating its access rights. That is, the new access token is intended to be the next one in an active token series and to supersede the latest access token in that token series. The "token_series_id" parameter MUST NOT be included in an access token request, if the requested access token is the first one of a new token series. If included, this parameter specifies the binary identifier of the token series that the new access token is intended to extend. The identifier does not change throughout the duration of the token series and was provided to C in the access token response that the AS sent when issuing the first access token in that token series. When the access token request is encoded in CBOR, this parameter is a CBOR byte string, with value the identifier of the token series. When the access token request is encoded in JSON, this parameter has as value the base64url-encoded text string that encodes the identifier of the token series.
The "token_series_id" parameter is OPTIONAL to include in an access token response. The "token_series_id" parameter MUST NOT be included in an access token response, if the issued access token is not the first one of a new token series. If included, this parameter specifies the binary identifier of the token series to which the issued access token belongs. When the access token response is encoded in CBOR, this parameter is a CBOR byte string, with value the identifier of the token series. When the access token request is encoded in JSON, this parameter has as value the base64url-encoded text string that encodes the identifier of the token series.

If the AS relies on the "token_series_id" parameter to exchange the identifier of token series with clients, then the following applies.

The value assigned to the identifier of a token series MUST be associated with all the access tokens issued by the AS for that token series and MUST be selected from a pool that the AS exclusively controls. In particular, the triple (TS_ID, C, AUD) MUST uniquely identify a token series and its corresponding access tokens, where TS_ID is the identifier of the token series, while C and AUD are the client and the audience for which the access token is issued, respectively. The AS MUST take into account both ongoing and ended token series for selecting a new TS_ID that complies with the requirements above. Note that the ACE profile used is not part of the triple, hence the requirement spans across all the ACE profiles that the AS and its registered clients/RSs support.
An issued access token that belongs to a token series MUST include the identifier of that token series. This allows the RS to identify the latest access token in the token series to be superseded by the issued access token. In particular, each of such access tokens MUST include a claim specifying the identifier of the token series to which the access token belongs. When CWTs are used as access tokens, such claim can be the "token_series_id" claim registered in , which has the same semantics as the "token_series_id" parameter of an access token response encoded in CBOR. When JWTs are used as access tokens, such claim can be the "token_series_id" claim registered in , which has the same semantics as the "token_series_id" parameter of an access token response encoded in JSON.

If a profile of ACE relies on a construct that uses different parameters/claims to transport the identifier of a token series, then the new "token_series_id" parameter and "token_series_id" claim MUST NOT be used when using that profile. For example, a number of parameters/claims are already used to transport information that acts as de facto identifier of token series, in the PSK mode of the DTLS profile , in the OSCORE profile , and in the LAKE and OSCORE profile .

updated_rights This section defines the additional "updated_rights" parameter. The parameter can be used in a POST request sent by the AS to the authz-info endpoint at the RS (see ), when the AS uploads an access token to the RS per the SDC workflow defined in of the present document. The "updated_rights" parameter MUST NOT be included in the POST request to the authz-info endpoint sent by C per the original workflow defined in . The "updated_rights" parameter MUST be included in the POST request sent by the AS to the authz-info endpoint at the RS, if the uploaded access token is not the first one of a new token series, i.e., if the AS has issued the access token for dynamically updating the access rights of C. Otherwise, the "updated_rights" parameter MUST NOT be included. When including the "updated_rights" parameter, the following applies:

If the POST request is encoded in CBOR, the request MUST have media type "application/ace+cbor" and its payload MUST be formatted as a CBOR map. In particular, the CBOR map MUST include the "updated_rights" parameter encoding the CBOR simple value true (0xf5) and the "access_token" parameter specifying the access token.
If the POST request is encoded in JSON, the request MUST have media type "application/ace+json" and its payload MUST be formatted as a JSON object. In particular, the JSON object MUST include the "updated_rights" parameter with value true and the "access_token" parameter specifying the access token.

Note that this request deviates from the POST request defined in , although such a deviation can already occur in some profiles of ACE (e.g., see ) or in application profiles of . shows an example where the AS uploads an access token at the RS on behalf of C, by sending a POST request encoded in CBOR to the authz-info endpoint at the RS. In this example, the access token dynamically updates the access rights of C by extending an existing token series, hence the request payload also conveys the "updated_rights" parameter encoding the CBOR simple value true (0xf5).

Example of AS-to-RS POST Request to the authz-info endpoint. The access token dynamically updates the access rights of C by extending an existing token series, hence the request conveys the "updated_rights" parameter with value true (0xf6). The following focuses on interactions with the authz-info endpoint at the RS where messages are encoded in CBOR. The same as described below holds in the case that such messages are encoded in JSON and have media type "application/ace+json", with the difference that the "updated_rights" parameter with value true can be present within a JSON object conveyed by a POST request to the authz-info endpoint.

Processing at the RS When the RS receives a protected POST request to the authz-info endpoint from the AS and the request does not convey the "updated_rights" parameter, the RS is ensured that the access token conveyed in the request is the first one of a new token series, which the RS processes accordingly (see ). When the RS receives a protected POST request to the authz-info endpoint from the AS and the request conveys the "updated_rights" parameter encoding the CBOR simple value true (0xf5), the RS is ensured that the access token conveyed in the request is not the first one of a new token series. Taking advantage of such explicit indication requires the RS to support the Content-Format "application/ace+cbor" and the "updated_rights" parameter. If the RS does not support the Content-Format "application/ace+cbor", the RS rejects the POST request from the AS and replies with an error response that has a response code equivalent to the CoAP code 4.15 (Unsupported Content-Format). Note that, irrespective of the profile of ACE used, the RS supports the Content-Format "application/ace+cbor" if it implements token introspection as defined in . If the RS supports the Content-Format "application/ace+cbor" but does not support the "updated_rights" parameter, the RS rejects the POST request from the AS and replies with an error response that has a response code equivalent to the CoAP code 4.00 (Bad Request). In the case that a POST request to the authz-info endpoint includes the "updated_rights" parameter, the RS supports the parameter, and any of the following conditions applies, then the RS MUST reject the request and MUST reply with an error response that has a response code equivalent to the CoAP code 4.00 (Bad Request):

The request is not protected.
The AS is not successfully verified as the originator of the request.
The "updated_rights" parameter does not encode the CBOR simple value true (0xf5).

If none of the error conditions above applies and the request is valid, then the RS leverages the "updated_rights" parameter encoding the CBOR simple value true (0xf5) as an indication from the AS that the access token conveyed in the POST request, namely T_NEW, is not the first one of its token series. That is, the access token is meant to dynamically update the access rights of C, while preserving the same secure communication association that is shared between C and the RS. In this case, the RS uses lookup information specified within T_NEW to determine whether it stores an access token T_OLD associated with C and belonging to the same token series of T_NEW. Such lookup information includes an identifier of the token series to which both T_NEW and T_OLD belong, and it can further comprise additional information elements pertaining to the specific profile of ACE used (e.g., the authentication credential of C that is bound to the access tokens of the token series). By leveraging such lookup information, the RS checks whether it stores an access token T_OLD that belongs to the same token series of T_NEW, like it would when receiving the request from C and according to the specific profile of ACE used. If the RS is currently storing such an old access token T_OLD and successfully validates the access token T_NEW, then the new access token T_NEW supersedes T_OLD, i.e., the RS MUST replace the authorization information specified in T_OLD with that specified in T_NEW, and it MUST associate T_NEW with the same secure communication association with which T_OLD was associated. Finally, the RS replies to the AS with a successful response that has a response code equivalent to the CoAP code 2.01 (Created). Instead, if the RS is not currently storing such an old access token T_OLD, then the RS MUST reject the POST request from the AS and MUST reply with an error response that has a response code equivalent to the CoAP code 5.00 (Internal Server Error). The error response is analogous to error responses sent by the AS (see ) and MUST include the error code "missing_old_token". The error code and its CBOR abbreviation are registered in and , respectively. The explicit indication provided by the "updated_rights" parameter prevents possible ambiguous situations, where the RS might erroneously believe that the access token conveyed in the POST request is the first one of a new token series (e.g., following the deletion of stored access tokens due to memory limitations). This is further discussed in .

Follow-up at the AS After sending to the authz-info endpoint a protected POST request that conveys the access token T_NEW and the "updated_rights" parameter encoding the CBOR simple value true (0xf5), the AS proceeds as follows when receiving a response from the RS.

If the AS receives a successful response, the AS MUST reply to C with an access token response, consistent with the issue of the access token T_NEW. The access token response includes the "token_upload" parameter encoding the value 0 (see ). Also, the access token response includes the "access_token" parameter, or the "token_hash" parameter, or none of those, depending on the value of the "token_upload" parameter in the corresponding access token request.
If the AS receives an error response that includes the error code "missing_old_token" (see ), the AS MUST proceed as defined in .
If the AS receives any other error response, the AS MUST reply to C with an access token response, consistent with the issue of the access token T_NEW. The access token response includes the "access_token" parameter specifying the access token T_NEW and the "token_upload" parameter encoding the value 1 (see ).

The AS MUST ignore the error code "missing_old_token", if the POST request did not convey the "updated_rights" parameter encoding the CBOR simple value true (0xf5). In the case that the access token T_NEW targets a group-audience (see ), what is specified in about the token upload at the RSs in the group-audience applies to T_NEW. In particular, the AS replies to C with an access token response after the token upload of T_NEW terminates as per what is defined in .

New Token Series Created on the Fly As defined in , the RS replies to the AS with an error response that includes the error code "missing_old_token", if the RS cannot find the old access token T_OLD to be superseded by the access token T_NEW that the AS uploaded to the authz-info endpoint. Profiles of ACE typically prescribe that, in such case, the RS does not have anymore the secure communication association that was previously shared with C and bound to T_OLD. Therefore, if the AS simply completes the issue of T_NEW and provides it to C, this would result in C sending a protected POST request including T_NEW to the authz-info endpoint at the RS, according to the original workflow. However, since the RS does not store T_OLD and does not have the corresponding secure communication association used by C to protect the POST request, the RS would reply to C with an unprotected error response. After that, C would finally send a new access token request to the token endpoint at the AS, asking for a new access token of a new token series. Instead, under the specific circumstance in question, the procedure defined below avoids that C and the RS perform such an inefficient and unsuccessful exchange. In the interest of performing this procedure, an AS that supports the SDC workflow MUST store the access token request that results in issuing the first access token of a token series, until the token series ends. After having uploaded T_NEW to the RS and received an error response that includes the error code "missing_old_token", the AS MUST create a new token series "on the fly", as defined below. The rest of this section uses the following notation:

REQ_STORED: the access token request that resulted in the AS issuing the first access token of the token series to which T_OLD and T_NEW belong.
REQ_RECEIVED: the access token request that resulted in the AS composing T_NEW and attempting to upload it at the RS with no success.

The AS performs the following steps.

The AS retrieves REQ_STORED from its local storage.
The AS composes a new access token request REQ_BUILT that is equal to REQ_STORED retrieved at Step 1, with the following differences:
- The "scope" parameter is present in REQ_BUILT if and only if the "scope" parameter is present in the access token request REQ_RECEIVED. If present, the "scope" parameter in REQ_BUILT specifies the same scope that is specified by the "scope" parameter within REQ_RECEIVED.
- The parameters "token_upload" (see ), "to_rs" (see ), and "cnonce" (see ) are not included in REQ_BUILT.
The AS revokes the access tokens T_OLD and T_NEW, thus ending the token series they belong to. The AS can rely on the method defined in to notify about the revoked access tokens. Then, the AS deletes REQ_STORED from its local storage.
The AS processes REQ_BUILT as if it was received from C. If the AS successfully processes REQ_BUILT, the AS issues an access token T_NEXT as the first access token of a new token series. Like for T_NEW, also T_NEXT is issued to C, for the same targeted audience, and per the same profile of ACE. Like any other access token request that results in starting a new token series, the AS stores REQ_BUILT throughout the duration of the new token series to which T_NEXT belongs.
The AS replies to REQ_RECEIVED with an access token response consistent with the issue of T_NEXT as the first access token of a new token series. In particular, the following applies to the access token response:
- The "access_token" parameter is present and specifies the access token T_NEXT.
- The "token_upload" parameter is present and encodes the value 2 (see ).
- The "scope" parameter is present if and only if: i) it was present in REQ_BUILT and the access rights granted to C are different from the requested ones; or ii) it was not present in REQ_BUILT and the access rights granted to C are different from the default ones. If the "scope" parameter is not present, then the granted access rights are those requested by the "scope" parameter in REQ_BUILT if present therein, or the default access rights otherwise. The granted access rights are specified by the issued access token T_NEXT.

Updated ace_profile Parameter This section extends the semantics of the "ace_profile" parameter defined in for the OAuth 2.0 token endpoint at the AS. In addition to what is specified in Sections , , and of , the following applies.

When sending an access token request to the token endpoint at the AS (see ), C MAY include the "ace_profile" parameter, specifying the identifier of the profile that C wishes to use towards the RS. The "ace_profile" parameter MUST NOT be included in an access token request, if the requested access token is not the first one of a new token series.
If the AS receives an access token request for requesting the first access token of a new token series and the request includes the "ace_profile" parameter specifying the identifier of a profile, then the AS proceeds as follows. In the case that the AS does not issue access tokens per the profile specified in the access token request, or C and the RS do not share that profile, then the AS MUST reject the request and MUST reply with an error response (see ). The error response MUST have a response code equivalent to the CoAP code 4.00 (Bad Request) and MUST include the error code "incompatible_ace_profiles". In the case that the AS issues an access token to C, the access token MUST be per the profile whose identifier was specified by the "ace_profile" parameter in the access token request. In the case that the AS replies to C with an access token response (see ), then the response MAY include the "ace_profile" parameter. If it is included in the access token response, the "ace_profile" parameter MUST encode the same profile identifier that was specified by the "ace_profile" parameter of the corresponding access token request. The "ace_profile" parameter MUST NOT be included in the access token response, if the issued access token is not the first one of a new token series.

Coordinating on the Exchange of Public Authentication Credentials In some profiles of ACE, it is possible for C and the RS to use public authentication credentials. Depending on the specific profile, the access token request and response exchanged between C and the AS can specify those authentication credentials as transported by value or instead identified by reference. For instance, this is the case in the LAKE and OSCORE profile and in the DTLS profile as extended in . At some point, the AS (C) might become unable to use a credential identifier as a reference for accessing the authentication credential of C (of the RS) obtained earlier, e.g., due to having deleted the credential from its local storage. This can prevent the AS (C) from successfully processing an incoming access token request (response) that specifies the authentication credential of C (of the RS) as identified by reference. Ultimately, this can prevent the AS from issuing an access token and C from securely accessing protected resources at the RS. Conversely, unbeknown to the AS, C might already be storing the authentication credential of the RS when sending the access token request. In such a situation, the AS would specify the authentication credential of the RS by value in the access token response. However, it would be sufficient for C that the response specified the credential of the RS as identified by reference, or even that the response omitted the credential altogether. In order to allow C and the AS to coordinate on the exchange of the authentication credentials of C and the RS, the rest of this section defines:

How the AS can instruct C to specify its public authentication credential by value in the "req_cnf" parameter of an access token request (see ).
How C can instruct the AS to specify the public authentication credential(s) of the RS(s) by value or by reference in the "rs_cnf" or "rs_cnf2" parameter of an access token response (see ), or instead to omit the credential(s) from the access token response.

Instructing C on How to Provide its Authentication Credential When the AS receives an access token request and this includes the "req_cnf" parameter identifying the public authentication credential of C by reference, it might happen that the AS is not able to access the credential by using the specified reference. In such a case, the AS MUST reject the request and MUST reply with an error response (see ). The error response MUST have a response code equivalent to the CoAP code 5.00 (Internal Server Error) and MUST include the error code "unknown_credential_referenced". The error code and its CBOR abbreviation are registered in and , respectively. After receiving such an error response, C can send a new access token request, where the "req_cnf" parameter specifies the authentication credential of C by value.

Instructing the AS on How to Provide the RS's Authentication Credential When C receives an access token response and this includes the "req_cnf" or "req_cnf2" parameter identifying the authentication credential(s) of the RS(s) by reference, it might happen that C is not able to access the authentication credential(s) by using the specified reference(s). Conversely, if the response includes the "rs_cnf" or "rs_cnf2" parameter specifying the authentication credential(s) of the RS(s) by value, it might happen that C has already been storing those credential(s), unbeknown to the AS. In fact, it would have been sufficient that the "rs_cnf" or "rs_cnf2" parameter identified the credential(s) by reference, or that neither parameter was included in the response. The following extends the semantics of the "rs_cnf" parameter defined in , so that C can include the "rs_cnf" parameter in an access token request. When doing so, C instructs the AS about whether and how the access token response should specify the authentication credential(s) of the RS(s) belonging to the targeted audience. Per its extended semantics, the "rs_cnf" parameter is also OPTIONAL to include in an access token request when requesting the first access token in a token series, if the token type is "pop" and asymmetric keys are used. In any other case, the parameter MUST NOT be included in an access token request. When C includes the "rs_cnf" parameter in an access token request encoded in CBOR, the parameter MUST have one of the following encodings.

If the parameter specifies the CBOR simple value true (0xf5), then it instructs the AS to include in the access token response the "rs_cnf" or "rs_cnf2" parameter, specifying the authentication credential(s) of the RS(s) by value. In the access token response, each pertaining authentication credential MUST be specified by value.
If the parameter specifies the CBOR simple value false (0xf4), then it instructs the AS to include in the access token response the "rs_cnf" or "rs_cnf2" parameter, specifying the authentication credential(s) of the RS(s) by reference. In the access token response, each pertaining authentication credential MUST be specified by reference, or alternatively by value only if that was not possible for the AS to attain.
If the parameter specifies the CBOR simple value null (0xf6), then it instructs the AS to omit the "rs_cnf" and "rs_cnf2" parameters from the access token response. In the access token response, the "rs_cnf" and "rs_cnf2" parameters MUST NOT be included.

If the access token request is encoded in JSON, the same as above applies, with the difference that the "rs_cnf" parameter specifies as appropriate the corresponding JSON values true, false, or null. If the AS is not able to comply in the first two cases above, then the AS MUST reject the request and MUST reply with an error response. The error response MUST have a response code equivalent to the CoAP code 5.00 (Internal Server Error). Irrespective of what "rs_cnf" specifies in the access token request, the parameter "rs_cnf" or "rs_cnf2" in the access token response specifies the authentication credential(s) used by the RS(s) to authenticate. In the case that C includes the "rs_cnf" parameter in the access token request and C does not currently store the authentication credential(s) of the RS(s) in the targeted audience, then the following applies:

The "rs_cnf" parameter MUST NOT specify the CBOR simple value null (0xf6) if the access token request is encoded in CBOR, or the value null if the access token request is encoded in JSON.
The "rs_cnf" parameter SHOULD NOT specify the CBOR simple value false (0xf4) if the access token request is encoded in CBOR, or the value false if the access token request is encoded in JSON. Exceptions apply if C is confident that it can later acquire and validate the authentication credential(s) of the RS(s) by other means, e.g., by using the references provided by the AS for retrieval from a trusted repository.

Failed Verification of Proof of Possession at the AS When sending an access token request to the AS (see ), a client can include the "req_cnf" parameter defined in in order to provide the AS with a specific PoP key to bind to the requested access token. Typically, the PoP key in question is the client's public key. In such a case, as per , the AS has to verify proof of possession of the client's private key, i.e., that the client is indeed in possession of the private key corresponding to the public key conveyed in the "req_cnf" parameter. The AS might have previously achieved proof of possession of the private key in question, e.g., from previous interactions with the client or through out-of-band means. Alternatively, a profile of ACE might define how the AS verifies a PoP evidence that the client computes and provides to the AS by means of a parameter included in the access token request (e.g., see ). Irrespective of the method used, if the AS fails to verify the proof of possession of the client's private key, then the AS MUST reject the access token request and MUST reply with an error response (see ). The error response MUST have a response code equivalent to the CoAP code 4.00 (Bad Request) and MUST include the error code "failed_pop_verification". The error code and its CBOR abbreviation are registered in and , respectively.

Updated Payload Format of Error Responses This section deprecates the original payload format of error responses conveying an error code, when CBOR is used to encode message payloads in the ACE framework. That format is referred to, e.g., when defining the error responses of Sections and of . Also, this section defines a new payload format that allows such error responses to convey an error code together with further error-specific information, according to the problem-details format specified in . Such error responses MUST have Content-Format set to "application/concise-problem-details+cbor". The payload of these error responses MUST be a CBOR map specifying a Concise Problem Details data item (see ). The CBOR map is formatted as follows:

It MUST include the Custom Problem Detail entry "ace-error" registered in of this document. This entry is formatted as a CBOR map including only one field, namely "error-code". The map key for the "error-code" field is the CBOR integer with value 0. The value of the "error-code" field is a CBOR integer specifying the error code associated with the occurred error. This value is taken from the "CBOR Value" column of the "OAuth Error Code CBOR Mappings" registry . The "error-code" field conveys the same information that the original payload format conveys through the "error" parameter (see, e.g., Sections and of ). The CDDL notation of the "ace-error" entry is given below.

int } ]]>

It MAY include further Standard Problem Detail entries or Custom Problem Detail entries (see ). The following Standard Problem Detail entries are of particular relevance for the ACE framework.
- "detail" (map key -2): its value is a CBOR text string that specifies a human-readable diagnostic description of the occurred error (see ). The diagnostic text is intended for software engineers as well as for device and network operators in order to aid in debugging and provide context for possible intervention. The diagnostic message SHOULD be logged by the sender of the error response. The "detail" entry is unlikely to be relevant in an unattended setup where human intervention is not expected. When the Standard Problem Detail entry "detail" is included, it conveys the same information that the original payload format conveys through the "error_description" parameter (see, e.g., Sections and of ).
- "instance" (map key -3): its value is a URI reference identifying the specific occurrence of the error (see ). When the Standard Problem Detail entry "instance" is included, it conveys the same information that the original payload format conveys through the "error_uri" parameter (see, e.g., Sections and of ).

An example of an error response using the problem-details format is shown in .

Example of Error Response with Problem Details. When the ACE framework is used with CBOR for encoding message payloads, the following applies:

It is RECOMMENDED that authorization servers, clients, and resource servers support the payload format defined in this section.
Authorization servers, clients, and resource servers that support the payload format defined in this section MUST use it when composing an outgoing error response that conveys an error code.

Updated Requirements on Profiles of ACE compiles a list of requirements on the profiles of ACE. This document amends two of those requirements as follows. The text of the fifth requirement

Specify the security protocol the client and RS must use to protect their communication (e.g., OSCORE or DTLS). This must provide encryption and integrity and replay protection (Section 5.8.4.3).

is replaced by the following text:

Specify the security protocol the client and RS must use to protect their communication (e.g., OSCORE or DTLS). In combination with the used communication protocol, this must provide encryption, integrity and replay protection, and a binding between requests and responses (Section 5.8.4.3 and Section 6.5).

The text of the tenth requirement

Specify the communication and security protocol for interactions between the client and AS. This must provide encryption, integrity protection, replay protection, and a binding between requests and responses (Sections 5 and 5.8).

is replaced by the following text:

Specify the communication and security protocol for interactions between the client and AS. The combined use of those protocols must provide encryption, integrity protection, replay protection, and a binding between requests and responses (Sections 5 and 5.8).

At the time of writing, all the profiles of ACE that are published as RFC (i.e., ) already comply with the two updated requirements as formulated above.

LAKE EAD Item for Transporting a Session Identifier The Lightweight Authenticated Key Exchange (LAKE) protocol defines the transport of additional External Authorization Data (EAD) within an optional EAD field of the LAKE messages (see ). An EAD field is composed of one or multiple EAD items, each of which specifies an identifying 'ead_label' encoded as a CBOR integer and an optional 'ead_value' encoded as a CBOR byte string. When using the LAKE and OSCORE profile of ACE defined in , C and the RS run the LAKE protocol to establish an OSCORE Security Context , which is used to secure communications when C accesses protected resources at the RS, according to the authorization information indicated in an access token. Specifically, the access token is bound to C's authentication credential AUTH_CRED_C that C uses during the LAKE session for authenticating itself to the RS. Per the LAKE and OSCORE profile, the first access token of a token series is specified by C to the RS during a LAKE session between the two peers. To this end, defines the EAD item ACE-OAuth Access Token for specifying an access token by value in the EAD field of a LAKE message from C to the RS. This section defines an alternative EAD item for specifying an access token by reference, through its associated LAKE session identifier. The name of the EAD item is Session ID, for which the CDDL grammar is shown in .

LAKE EAD Item Session ID. In particular:

ead_label is the integer value TBD registered in .
ead_value is a CBOR byte string equal to the value of the "session_id" field within the LAKE_Information object specified by the "lake_info" parameter of the access token response from the AS, when issuing the first access token of a token series (see ).

Note to RFC Editor: Please replace TBD with the value registered for Session ID in , then delete this note. This EAD item is critical, i.e., it is used only with the negative value of its ead_label, indicating that the receiving RS must progress the protocol using the access token associated with the identifier specified in the ead_value and with the AUTH_CRED_C used in the LAKE session, or else abort the LAKE session (see ) The EAD Item Session ID is useful in two circumstances:

When using the SDC workflow defined in , C can indicate to the AS that it does not want to receive the issued access token (i.e., the access token request specifies the "token_upload" parameter with value 0 or 1), in the case that the AS successfully uploads the access token to the RS (i.e., the access token response specifies the "token_upload" parameter with value 0). Even in such a case where C does not obtain the issued access token, C obtains the "session_id" associated with the access token and specified in the access token response. Consequently, C can still specify the access token by reference during the LAKE session with the RS, by using the EAD item Session ID.
After having completed a LAKE session with the RS and while still storing a valid access token, C might choose to re-run LAKE with the RS. For example, the LAKE session or the derived OSCORE Security Context might have become invalid, or C receives unprotected error responses from the RS and determines that the RS has deleted the Security Context (e.g., due to memory limitations). As another example, C could want to update its current secure communication association with the RS by establishing a new OSCORE Security Context, specifically through a new LAKE session to leverage the exchange of ephemeral keys. Even in such a case where C can specify the access token by value, it is possible for C to instead specify the access token by reference during the LAKE session with the RS, by using the EAD item Session ID as a way to reduce communication overhead.

The EAD item Session ID is used only when uploading the first access token of a token series, but not for the dynamic update of access rights (see ). Analogously to the EAD item ACE-OAuth Access Token defined in and consistent with what is defined in , the EAD item Session ID is used to specify the access token by reference as follows:

If the LAKE forward message flow is used (see ), the EAD item is included in the EAD_3 field of LAKE message_3. As per , the EAD_3 field must not include multiple EAD items specifying the access token.
Instead, if the LAKE reverse message flow is used (see ), the EAD item is included in the EAD_4 field of LAKE message_4. As per , the EAD_4 field must not include multiple EAD items specifying the access token.

A client or resource server MUST support the EAD item Session ID if it both supports the SDC workflow and implements the LAKE and OSCORE profile of ACE. Consequently, C is ensured that the RS supports the EAD item Session ID when C receives an access token response specifying the "token_upload" parameter with value 0 and not including the "access_token" parameter, following the issue of an access token for accessing protected resources at the RS. Besides that, C can learn about the RS' support for the EAD item through indications from the AS within the LAKE_Information object specified by the "lake_info" parameter of the access token response, or by using other means such as, for example, those defined in . Example: assuming that ead_label is 2 and that the value of the "session_id" field within the LAKE_Information object specified by the "lake_info" parameter of the access token response from the AS is equal to h'01fc', the critical EAD item is as follows: Note to RFC Editor: Please replace the value of the ead_label with the value registered for Session ID in , then delete this note.

Operational Considerations This section compiles the operational considerations that hold for this document.

Logging When performing its normal operations, an AS is expected to produce timestamped logs about the following:

The reception and processing outcome of an access token request, e.g., in terms of its failure/success and issuance of an access token.
The outcome of uploading an issued access token at one or multiple RSs on behalf of the requesting client, as per the SDC workflow.
Events pertaining the lifecycle of issued access tokens (e.g., their issuance, expiration, and potential revocation) and the lifecycle of the token series to which those access tokens belong to.
The registration and deregistration of clients and RSs at the AS.

Similarly, when performing its normal operations, it is desirable that an RS produces timestamped logs about the following, to the extent afforded by its available memory, computing, and energy resources:

The reception and processing outcome of an access token, e.g., in terms of its failure/success.
Events pertaining the lifecycle of processed access tokens (e.g., their rejection, acceptance, storing, and deletion).
Failed accesses to protected resources due to missing/insufficient access rights for the requesting client per the stored access tokens.

Requests at the AS (e.g., from a client requesting an access token) or at the RS (e.g., for uploading an access token or for accessing a protected resource) can be effectively characterized by the transport-specific information of the request, together with the secure communication association shared with the requester as applicable. Although log entries are produced by the AS/RS, the storage, management, controlled sharing, and disposal of logs could be entrusted to a designated storage point that can be the AS/RS itself or instead a separate trusted entity. Besides what is compiled above, the AS/RS could produce additional information to log. Further details about what the AS/RS logs, with what granularity, and based on what triggering events and conditions are application-specific and left to operators to define. The AS/RS MUST NOT log any secret or confidential information pertaining to its operations. For example, this includes cryptographic secrets pertaining to (the establishment of) secure communication associations and keying material derived thereof, including own private keys associated with authentication credentials used for establishing secure communication associations. It is up to the application to specify for how long a log entry is retained from the time of its creation and until its deletion. Different retention policies could be enforced, for example, depending on what log entries pertain to (e.g., the successful/failed issuance (processing) of an access token at the AS (RS)), or on the secure communication association shared with the specific requester. For a given set of log entries that are grouped together according to certain criteria, the oldest log entries are expected to be those deleted first. It is out of the scope of this document what specific semantics and data model are used by the AS/RS for producing and processing the logs. Specific semantics and data models can be defined by applications and future specifications. It is expected that the logs produced are made available for secure access by authorized external management applications and operators. In particular, logged information could be retrieved in the following ways.

By accessing logs at the designated storage point through polling. This can occur in an occasional, regular, or event-driven way.
Through notifications sent by the designated storage point according to an operator-defined frequency.
Through notifications asynchronously sent by the designated storage point, throttling them in order to prevent congestion and duplication and to not create attack vectors.

From the perspective of an individual management application or network operator, knowledge gained from the logged information can be useful for managing the installation, enforcement, revision, and retirement of access policies at the AS, as well as for identifying clients or RSs for which troubleshooting, upgrade, re-enrollment, eviction, or decommissioning should be considered. Some of the logged information can be privacy-sensitive. This especially holds for the metadata about clients and RSs, i.e., their addressing information and, when applicable, (identifiers of) their authentication credentials that are used to authenticate with the other parties when establishing and using a secure communication association. If external management applications and operators obtain such metadata, they become able to track a given client or RS, as to its interactions with one or multiple other clients, RSs, and/or ASes. Therefore, the logged information that is effectively provided to external management applications and operators SHOULD be redacted by the designated storage point, by omitting any privacy-sensitive information element that could enable or facilitate the impairment of clients' and RSs' privacy, e.g., by tracking those as they interact with other parties. Exceptions could apply, e.g., if the designated storage point can verify that the management application or operator in question is specifically authorized to obtain such privacy-sensitive information and appropriately entitled to obtain it according to enforced privacy policies.

Management and Distribution of Keying Material The approach used to manage and distribute keying material depend on the specific profile of ACE used, for example . In turn, the approach used depends on the specific security protocol used between clients, RSs, and ASes, which is also specified by the profile of ACE used. compiles the list of requirements on profiles of ACE, two of which are amended in of the present document. Irrespective of the specific profile used, clients, RSs, and ASes that communicate with one another have to use a secure communication association and be mutually authenticated (see ).

Access Control The enforcement of access control at RSs is the main goal of the ACE framework. The enforcement of access control at the AS relies on the authenticated interaction of a client/RS at the AS. For example, this applies to a client sending an access token request to the token endpoint at the AS (see ), or to an RS sending a token introspection request to the introspect endpoint at the AS to perform token introspection (see ). For a client/RS, the secure communication association shared with the AS is bound to its active registration at the AS, which the AS maintains together with related information until a possible deregistration occurs (e.g., due to a decommissioning of the client/RS). The registration process at the AS is out of scope for this document as well for the ACE framework (see ).

Security Considerations The same security considerations from the ACE framework apply to this document, together with those from the specific profile of ACE used. When using the problem-details format defined in for error responses, the privacy and security considerations from Sections and of also apply. Furthermore, the following considerations apply.

Explicit Indication of Update of Access Rights in the SDC Workflow According to some profiles of ACE, C can request a new access token to dynamically update its access rights, while preserving the current secure communication association shared with the RS. In such case, the new access token is intended to supersede the current one stored at the RS, as they both belong to the same token series. When using the original workflow of ACE defined in , C uploads the new access token at the RS by protecting the message exchange through the current secure communication association shared with the RS and bound to the access token to be superseded. In fact, the use of such secure communication association allows the RS to determine that the upload of the new access token is specifically intended to updating the access rights of C. When using the SDC workflow defined in this document, the AS can upload the new access token at the RS on behalf of C, i.e., also in the case where the access token is issued to dynamically update the access rights of C. In particular, the message exchange between the AS and the RS is protected by means of a secure communication association shared between the AS and the RS, irrespective of the client for which the access token is issued. The new access token certainly provides the RS with information for recognizing the stored access token to be superseded, e.g., the "token_series_id" claim defined in or a different information element that the profile used relies on for other reasons. However, depending on the profile used, the new access token might not unambiguously indicate that it is specifically intended to extend an ongoing token series. Therefore, the upload of the new access token from the AS might lead to ambiguities. For example, the RS might have deleted a stored access token due to memory limitations. Although this effectively terminates the corresponding token series, such event is however impractical for the RS to remember indefinitely. Consequently, if the AS uploads at the RS a new access token belonging to that token series, it is possible that the RS accepts that access token and erroneously believes it to be the first one in a new token series, which contradicts the correct information available at the AS about the token series. The occurrence of such contradiction is prevented by means of the "updated_rights" parameter (see ), which the AS includes in a POST request to the authz-info endpoint at the RS only when uploading an access token for dynamically updating the access rights of C.

IANA Considerations This document has the following actions for IANA. Note to RFC Editor: Please replace all occurrences of "[RFC-XXXX]" with the RFC number of this specification and delete this paragraph.

OAuth Parameters Registry IANA is asked to add the following entries to the "OAuth Parameters" registry within the "OAuth Parameters" registry group.

Name: token_upload
Parameter Usage Location: token request, token response
Change Controller: IETF
Reference: [RFC-XXXX]

Name: token_hash
Parameter Usage Location: token response
Change Controller: IETF
Reference: [RFC-XXXX]

Name: to_rs
Parameter Usage Location: token request
Change Controller: IETF
Reference: [RFC-XXXX]

Name: from_rs
Parameter Usage Location: token response
Change Controller: IETF
Reference: [RFC-XXXX]

Name: rs_cnf2
Parameter Usage Location: token response
Change Controller: IETF
Reference: [RFC-XXXX]

Name: audience2
Parameter Usage Location: token response
Change Controller: IETF
Reference: [RFC-XXXX]

Name: anchor_cnf
Parameter Usage Location: token response
Change Controller: IETF
Reference: [RFC-XXXX]

Name: token_series_id
Parameter Usage Location: token request, token response
Change Controller: IETF
Reference: [RFC-XXXX]

Name: updated_rights
Parameter Usage Location: as-rs request
Change Controller: IETF
Reference: [RFC-XXXX]

In the same registry, IANA is asked to update the entries for the following OAuth parameters identified by their name, so that the content of the "Parameter Usage Location" column and of the "Reference" column is as below:

access_token
- Parameter Usage Location: authorization response, token response, as-rs request
- Reference: [RFC6749][RFC-XXXX]
rs_cnf
- Parameter Usage Location: token request, token response
- Reference: [RFC9201, Section 5][RFC-XXXX, ]
nonce1
- Parameter Usage Location: client-rs request, as-rs request
- Reference: [RFC9203][RFC-XXXX]
nonce2
- Parameter Usage Location: rs-client response, rs-as response
- Reference: [RFC9203][RFC-XXXX]
ace_client_recipientid
- Parameter Usage Location: client-rs request, as-rs request
- Reference: [RFC9203][RFC-XXXX]
ace_server_recipientid
- Parameter Usage Location: rs-client response, rs-as response
- Reference: [RFC9203][RFC-XXXX]
sign_info
- Parameter Usage Location: client-rs request, rs-client response, as-rs request, rs-as response
- Reference: [RFC9594][RFC-XXXX]
kdcchallenge
- Parameter Usage Location: rs-client response, rs-as response
- Reference: [RFC9594][RFC-XXXX]
ecdh_info
- Parameter Usage Location: client-rs request, rs-client response, as-rs request, rs-as response
- Reference: [RFC-ietf-ace-key-groupcomm-oscore-21][RFC-XXXX]
kdc_dh_creds
- Parameter Usage Location: client-rs request, rs-client response, as-rs request, rs-as response
- Reference: [RFC-ietf-ace-key-groupcomm-oscore-21][RFC-XXXX]

Note to RFC Editor: In the last two entries above, please replace the occurrences of "RFC-ietf-ace-key-groupcomm-oscore-21" with the RFC number of that specification and delete this paragraph.

OAuth Parameters CBOR Mappings Registry IANA is asked to add the following entries to the "OAuth Parameters CBOR Mappings" registry within the "Authentication and Authorization for Constrained Environments (ACE)" registry group, following the procedure specified in .

Name: token_upload
CBOR Key: TBD (value between 1 and 255)
Value Type: unsigned integer
Reference: [RFC-XXXX]
Original Specification: [RFC-XXXX]

Name: token_hash
CBOR Key: TBD (value between 1 and 255)
Value Type: unsigned integer
Reference: [RFC-XXXX]
Original Specification: [RFC-XXXX]

Name: to_rs
CBOR Key: TBD (value between 1 and 255)
Value Type: byte string or #6.<uint>(bstr)
Reference: [RFC-XXXX]
Original Specification: [RFC-XXXX]

Name: from_rs
CBOR Key: TBD (value between 1 and 255)
Value Type: byte string or #6.<uint>(bstr)
Reference: [RFC-XXXX]
Original Specification: [RFC-XXXX]

Name: rs_cnf2
CBOR Key: TBD (value between 1 and 255)
Value Type: array
Reference: [RFC-XXXX]
Original Specification: [RFC-XXXX]

Name: audience2
CBOR Key: TBD (value between 1 and 255)
Value Type: array
Reference: [RFC-XXXX]
Original Specification: [RFC-XXXX]

Name: anchor_cnf
CBOR Key: TBD (value between 1 and 255)
Value Type: array
Reference: [RFC-XXXX]
Original Specification: [RFC-XXXX]

Name: token_series_id
CBOR Key: TBD (value between 1 and 255)
Value Type: byte string
Reference: [RFC-XXXX]
Original Specification: [RFC-XXXX]

Name: updated_rights
CBOR Key: TBD (value between 1 and 255)
Value Type: True
Reference: [RFC-XXXX]
Original Specification: [RFC-XXXX]

In the same registry, IANA is asked to update the entry for the OAuth parameter with name "rs_cnf", so that the content of the "Value Type" column and of the "Reference" column is as below:

Value Type: True or False or Null or map
Reference: [RFC9201, Section 3.2][RFC-XXXX, ]

JSON Web Token Claims Registry IANA is asked to add the following entry to the "JSON Web Token Claims" registry within the "JSON Web Token (JWT)" registry group, following the procedure specified in .

Claim Name: token_series_id
Claim Description: The identifier of a token series
Change Controller: IETF
Reference: [RFC-XXXX]

CBOR Web Token (CWT) Claims Registry IANA is asked to add the following entry to the "CBOR Web Token (CWT) Claims" registry within the "CBOR Web Token (CWT) Claims" registry group, following the procedure specified in .

Claim Name: token_series_id
Claim Description: The identifier of a token series
JWT Claim Name: token_series_id
Claim Key: TBD (value between 1 and 255)
Claim Value Type: byte string
Change Controller: IETF
Reference: [RFC-XXXX, ]

OAuth Extensions Error Registry IANA is asked to add the following entries to the "OAuth Extensions Error Registry" within the "OAuth Parameters" registry group.

Name: missing_old_token
Usage Location: authz-info error response
Protocol Extension: [RFC-XXXX]
Change Controller: IETF
Reference: [RFC-XXXX, ]

Name: unknown_credential_referenced
Usage Location: token error response
Protocol Extension: [RFC-XXXX]
Change Controller: IETF
Reference: [RFC-XXXX, ]

Name: failed_pop_verification
Usage Location: token error response
Protocol Extension: [RFC-XXXX]
Change Controller: IETF
Reference: [RFC-XXXX, ]

OAuth Error Code CBOR Mappings Registry IANA is asked to add the following entries to the "OAuth Error Code CBOR Mappings" registry within the "Authentication and Authorization for Constrained Environments (ACE)" registry group.

Name: missing_old_token
CBOR Value: TBD (value between 1 and 255)
Reference: [RFC-XXXX]
Original Specification: [RFC-XXXX]

Name: unknown_credential_referenced
CBOR Value: TBD (value between 1 and 255)
Reference: [RFC-XXXX]
Original Specification: [RFC-XXXX]

Name: failed_pop_verification
CBOR Value: TBD (value between 1 and 255)
Reference: [RFC-XXXX]
Original Specification: [RFC-XXXX]

Custom Problem Detail Keys Registry IANA is asked to register the following entry in the "Custom Problem Detail Keys" registry within the "Constrained RESTful Environments (CoRE) Parameters" registry group.

Key Value: TBD (value between 0 and 23)
Name: ace-error
Brief Description: Carry ACE problem details in a Concise Problem Details data item.
Change Controller: IETF
Reference: [RFC-XXXX, ]

EDHOC External Authorization Data Registry IANA is asked to add the following entry to the "EDHOC External Authorization Data" registry within the "Ephemeral Diffie-Hellman Over COSE (EDHOC)" registry group.

Name: Session ID
Label: TBD (value between 1 and 23)
Description: The identifier of a LAKE session
Reference: [RFC-XXXX],

References Normative References UTF-8, a transformation format of ISO 10646 ISO/IEC 10646-1 defines a large character set called the Universal Character Set (UCS) which encompasses most of the world's writing systems. The originally proposed encodings of the UCS, however, were not compatible with many current applications and protocols, and this has led to the development of UTF-8, the object of this memo. UTF-8 has the characteristic of preserving the full US-ASCII range, providing compatibility with file systems, parsers and other software that rely on US-ASCII values but are transparent to other values. This memo obsoletes and replaces RFC 2279. The Base16, Base32, and Base64 Data Encodings This document describes the commonly used base 64, base 32, and base 16 encoding schemes. It also discusses the use of line-feeds in encoded data, use of padding in encoded data, use of non-alphabet characters in encoded data, use of different encoding alphabets, and canonical encodings. [STANDARDS-TRACK] Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation List (CRL) Profile This memo profiles the X.509 v3 certificate and X.509 v2 certificate revocation list (CRL) for use in the Internet. An overview of this approach and model is provided as an introduction. The X.509 v3 certificate format is described in detail, with additional information regarding the format and semantics of Internet name forms. Standard certificate extensions are described and two Internet-specific extensions are defined. A set of required certificate extensions is specified. The X.509 v2 CRL format is described in detail along with standard and Internet-specific extensions. An algorithm for X.509 certification path validation is described. An ASN.1 module and examples are provided in the appendices. [STANDARDS-TRACK] The OAuth 2.0 Authorization Framework The OAuth 2.0 authorization framework enables a third-party application to obtain limited access to an HTTP service, either on behalf of a resource owner by orchestrating an approval interaction between the resource owner and the HTTP service, or by allowing the third-party application to obtain access on its own behalf. This specification replaces and obsoletes the OAuth 1.0 protocol described in RFC 5849. [STANDARDS-TRACK] Naming Things with Hashes This document defines a set of ways to identify a thing (a digital object in this case) using the output from a hash function. It specifies a new URI scheme for this purpose, a way to map these to HTTP URLs, and binary and human-speakable formats for these names. The various formats are designed to support, but not require, a strong link to the referenced object, such that the referenced object may be authenticated to the same degree as the reference to it. The reason for this work is to standardise current uses of hash outputs in URLs and to support new information-centric applications and other uses of hash outputs in protocols. The Constrained Application Protocol (CoAP) The Constrained Application Protocol (CoAP) is a specialized web transfer protocol for use with constrained nodes and constrained (e.g., low-power, lossy) networks. The nodes often have 8-bit microcontrollers with small amounts of ROM and RAM, while constrained networks such as IPv6 over Low-Power Wireless Personal Area Networks (6LoWPANs) often have high packet error rates and a typical throughput of 10s of kbit/s. The protocol is designed for machine- to-machine (M2M) applications such as smart energy and building automation. CoAP provides a request/response interaction model between application endpoints, supports built-in discovery of services and resources, and includes key concepts of the Web such as URIs and Internet media types. CoAP is designed to easily interface with HTTP for integration with the Web while meeting specialized requirements such as multicast support, very low overhead, and simplicity for constrained environments. JSON Web Token (JWT) JSON Web Token (JWT) is a compact, URL-safe means of representing claims to be transferred between two parties. The claims in a JWT are encoded as a JSON object that is used as the payload of a JSON Web Signature (JWS) structure or as the plaintext of a JSON Web Encryption (JWE) structure, enabling the claims to be digitally signed or integrity protected with a Message Authentication Code (MAC) and/or encrypted. Proof-of-Possession Key Semantics for JSON Web Tokens (JWTs) This specification describes how to declare in a JSON Web Token (JWT) that the presenter of the JWT possesses a particular proof-of- possession key and how the recipient can cryptographically confirm proof of possession of the key by the presenter. Being able to prove possession of a key is also sometimes described as the presenter being a holder-of-key. The JavaScript Object Notation (JSON) Data Interchange Format JavaScript Object Notation (JSON) is a lightweight, text-based, language-independent data interchange format. It was derived from the ECMAScript Programming Language Standard. JSON defines a small set of formatting rules for the portable representation of structured data. This document removes inconsistencies with other specifications of JSON, repairs specification errors, and offers experience-based interoperability guidance. CBOR Web Token (CWT) CBOR Web Token (CWT) is a compact means of representing claims to be transferred between two parties. The claims in a CWT are encoded in the Concise Binary Object Representation (CBOR), and CBOR Object Signing and Encryption (COSE) is used for added application-layer security protection. A claim is a piece of information asserted about a subject and is represented as a name/value pair consisting of a claim name and a claim value. CWT is derived from JSON Web Token (JWT) but uses CBOR rather than JSON. Concise Data Definition Language (CDDL): A Notational Convention to Express Concise Binary Object Representation (CBOR) and JSON Data Structures This document proposes a notational convention to express Concise Binary Object Representation (CBOR) data structures (RFC 7049). Its main goal is to provide an easy and unambiguous way to express structures for protocol messages and data formats that use CBOR or JSON. Proof-of-Possession Key Semantics for CBOR Web Tokens (CWTs) This specification describes how to declare in a CBOR Web Token (CWT) (which is defined by RFC 8392) that the presenter of the CWT possesses a particular proof-of-possession key. Being able to prove possession of a key is also sometimes described as being the holder-of-key. This specification provides equivalent functionality to "Proof-of-Possession Key Semantics for JSON Web Tokens (JWTs)" (RFC 7800) but using Concise Binary Object Representation (CBOR) and CWTs rather than JavaScript Object Notation (JSON) and JSON Web Tokens (JWTs). Concise Binary Object Representation (CBOR) The Concise Binary Object Representation (CBOR) is a data format whose design goals include the possibility of extremely small code size, fairly small message size, and extensibility without the need for version negotiation. These design goals make it different from earlier binary serializations such as ASN.1 and MessagePack. This document obsoletes RFC 7049, providing editorial improvements, new details, and errata fixes while keeping full compatibility with the interchange format of RFC 7049. It does not create a new version of the format. CBOR Object Signing and Encryption (COSE): Structures and Process Concise Binary Object Representation (CBOR) is a data format designed for small code size and small message size. There is a need to be able to define basic security services for this data format. This document defines the CBOR Object Signing and Encryption (COSE) protocol. This specification describes how to create and process signatures, message authentication codes, and encryption using CBOR for serialization. This specification additionally describes how to represent cryptographic keys using CBOR. This document, along with RFC 9053, obsoletes RFC 8152. CBOR Object Signing and Encryption (COSE): Initial Algorithms Concise Binary Object Representation (CBOR) is a data format designed for small code size and small message size. There is a need to be able to define basic security services for this data format. This document defines a set of algorithms that can be used with the CBOR Object Signing and Encryption (COSE) protocol (RFC 9052). This document, along with RFC 9052, obsoletes RFC 8152. Authentication and Authorization for Constrained Environments Using the OAuth 2.0 Framework (ACE-OAuth) This specification defines a framework for authentication and authorization in Internet of Things (IoT) environments called ACE-OAuth. The framework is based on a set of building blocks including OAuth 2.0 and the Constrained Application Protocol (CoAP), thus transforming a well-known and widely used authorization solution into a form suitable for IoT devices. Existing specifications are used where possible, but extensions are added and profiles are defined to better serve the IoT use cases. Additional OAuth Parameters for Authentication and Authorization for Constrained Environments (ACE) This specification defines new parameters and encodings for the OAuth 2.0 token and introspection endpoints when used with the framework for Authentication and Authorization for Constrained Environments (ACE). These are used to express the proof-of-possession (PoP) key the client wishes to use, the PoP key that the authorization server has selected, and the PoP key the resource server uses to authenticate to the client. Datagram Transport Layer Security (DTLS) Profile for Authentication and Authorization for Constrained Environments (ACE) This specification defines a profile of the Authentication and Authorization for Constrained Environments (ACE) framework that allows constrained servers to delegate client authentication and authorization. The protocol relies on DTLS version 1.2 or later for communication security between entities in a constrained network using either raw public keys or pre-shared keys. A resource-constrained server can use this protocol to delegate management of authorization information to a trusted host with less-severe limitations regarding processing power and memory. The Object Security for Constrained RESTful Environments (OSCORE) Profile of the Authentication and Authorization for Constrained Environments (ACE) Framework This document specifies a profile for the Authentication and Authorization for Constrained Environments (ACE) framework. It utilizes Object Security for Constrained RESTful Environments (OSCORE) to provide communication security and proof-of-possession for a key owned by the client and bound to an OAuth 2.0 access token. On Stable Storage for Items in Concise Binary Object Representation (CBOR) This document defines a stored ("file") format for Concise Binary Object Representation (CBOR) data items that is friendly to common systems that recognize file types, such as the Unix file(1) command. Concise Problem Details for Constrained Application Protocol (CoAP) APIs This document defines a concise "problem detail" as a way to carry machine-readable details of errors in a Representational State Transfer (REST) response to avoid the need to define new error response formats for REST APIs for constrained environments. The format is inspired by, but intended to be more concise than, the problem details for HTTP APIs defined in RFC 7807. Extension of the Datagram Transport Layer Security (DTLS) Profile for Authentication and Authorization for Constrained Environments (ACE) to Transport Layer Security (TLS) This document updates "Datagram Transport Layer Security (DTLS) Profile for Authentication and Authorization for Constrained Environments (ACE)" (RFC 9202) by specifying that the profile applies to TLS as well as DTLS. Message Queuing Telemetry Transport (MQTT) and Transport Layer Security (TLS) Profile of Authentication and Authorization for Constrained Environments (ACE) Framework This document specifies a profile for the Authentication and Authorization for Constrained Environments (ACE) framework to enable authorization in a publish-subscribe messaging system based on Message Queuing Telemetry Transport (MQTT). Proof-of-Possession keys, bound to OAuth 2.0 access tokens, are used to authenticate and authorize MQTT Clients. The protocol relies on TLS for confidentiality and MQTT server (Broker) authentication. Ephemeral Diffie-Hellman Over COSE (EDHOC) This document specifies Ephemeral Diffie-Hellman Over COSE (EDHOC), a very compact and lightweight authenticated Diffie-Hellman key exchange with ephemeral keys. EDHOC provides mutual authentication, forward secrecy, and identity protection. EDHOC is intended for usage in constrained scenarios, and a main use case is to establish an Object Security for Constrained RESTful Environments (OSCORE) security context. By reusing CBOR Object Signing and Encryption (COSE) for cryptography, Concise Binary Object Representation (CBOR) for encoding, and Constrained Application Protocol (CoAP) for transport, the additional code size can be kept very low. Notification of Revoked Access Tokens in the Authentication and Authorization for Constrained Environments (ACE) Framework This document specifies a method of the Authentication and Authorization for Constrained Environments (ACE) framework, which allows an authorization server to notify clients and resource servers (i.e., registered devices) about revoked access tokens. As specified in this document, the method allows clients and resource servers (RSs) to access a Token Revocation List (TRL) on the authorization server by using the Constrained Application Protocol (CoAP), with the possible additional use of resource observation. Resulting (unsolicited) notifications of revoked access tokens complement alternative approaches such as token introspection, while not requiring additional endpoints on clients and RSs. The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol Version 1.3 This document specifies version 1.3 of the Transport Layer Security (TLS) protocol. TLS allows client/server applications to communicate over the Internet in a way that is designed to prevent eavesdropping, tampering, and message forgery. This document obsoletes RFC 8446, which specified TLS 1.3. This document obsoletes RFC 5246 (specifying TLS 1.2) and RFCs 5077, 6961, 7627, and 8422, all of which pertain to TLS 1.2 or earlier, and updates RFCs 5705 and 6066. This document also specifies new requirements for TLS 1.2 implementations. Lightweight Authenticated Key Exchange (LAKE) and Object Security for Constrained RESTful Environments (OSCORE) Profile of the Authentication and Authorization for Constrained Environments (ACE) Framework Ericsson Ericsson RISE RISE This document specifies a profile for the Authentication and Authorization for Constrained Environments (ACE) framework. It utilizes the Lightweight Authenticated Key Exchange (LAKE) protocol for achieving mutual authentication between an ACE-OAuth client and resource server, and it binds an authentication credential of the client to an ACE-OAuth access token. LAKE also establishes an Object Security for Constrained RESTful Environments (OSCORE) Security Context, which is used to secure communications between the client and resource server when accessing protected resources according to the authorization information indicated in the access token. This profile can be used to delegate management of authorization information from a resource-constrained server to a trusted host with less severe limitations regarding processing power and memory. OAuth Parameters CBOR Mappings IANA JSON Web Token Claims IANA CBOR Web Token (CWT) Claims IANA OAuth Extensions Error Registry IANA OAuth Error Code CBOR Mappings IANA Custom Problem Detail Keys IANA Named Information Hash Algorithm Registry IANA OAuth Parameters IANA EDHOC External Authorization Data IANA Secure Hash Standard NIST Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement Levels In many standards track documents several words are used to signify the requirements in the specification. These words are often capitalized. This document defines these words as they should be interpreted in IETF documents. This document specifies an Internet Best Current Practices for the Internet Community, and requests discussion and suggestions for improvements. Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC 2119 Key Words RFC 2119 specifies common key words that may be used in protocol specifications. This document aims to reduce the ambiguity by clarifying that only UPPERCASE usage of the key words have the defined special meanings. Informative References Object Security for Constrained RESTful Environments (OSCORE) This document defines Object Security for Constrained RESTful Environments (OSCORE), a method for application-layer protection of the Constrained Application Protocol (CoAP), using CBOR Object Signing and Encryption (COSE). OSCORE provides end-to-end protection between endpoints communicating using CoAP or CoAP-mappable HTTP. OSCORE is designed for constrained nodes and networks supporting a range of proxy operations, including translation between different transport protocols. Although an optional functionality of CoAP, OSCORE alters CoAP options processing and IANA registration. Therefore, this document updates RFC 7252. Key Provisioning for Group Communication Using Authentication and Authorization for Constrained Environments (ACE) This document defines how to use the Authentication and Authorization for Constrained Environments (ACE) framework to distribute keying material and configuration parameters for secure group communication. Candidate group members that act as Clients and are authorized to join a group can do so by interacting with a Key Distribution Center (KDC) acting as the Resource Server, from which they obtain the keying material to communicate with other group members. While defining general message formats as well as the interface and operations available at the KDC, this document supports different approaches and protocols for secure group communication. Therefore, details are delegated to separate application profiles of this document as specialized instances that target a particular group communication approach and define how communications in the group are protected. Compliance requirements for such application profiles are also specified. Coordinating the Use of Application Profiles for the Lightweight Authenticated Key Exchange (LAKE) Protocol RISE AB RISE AB The Lightweight Authenticated Key Exchange (LAKE) protocol requires certain parameters to be agreed out-of-band, in order to ensure its successful completion. To this end, application profiles specify the intended use of LAKE to allow for the relevant processing and verifications to be made. In order to ensure the applicability of such parameters and information beyond transport- or setup-specific scenarios, this document defines a canonical, CBOR-based representation that can be used to describe, distribute, and store LAKE application profiles. Furthermore, in order to facilitate interoperability between LAKE implementations and support LAKE extensibility for additional integrations, this document defines a number of means to coordinate the use of LAKE application profiles. Finally, this document defines a set of well-known LAKE application profiles. The Group Object Security for Constrained RESTful Environments (Group OSCORE) Profile of the Authentication and Authorization for Constrained Environments (ACE) Framework RISE AB RISE AB Ericsson AB This document specifies a profile for the Authentication and Authorization for Constrained Environments (ACE) framework. The profile uses Group Object Security for Constrained RESTful Environments (Group OSCORE) to provide communication security between a client and one or multiple resource servers that are members of an OSCORE group. The profile securely binds an OAuth 2.0 access token to the public key of the client associated with the private key used by that client in the OSCORE group. The profile uses Group OSCORE to achieve server authentication and proof of possession of the client's private key. Also, it provides proof of the client's membership to the OSCORE group by binding the access token to information that pertains to the Group OSCORE Security Context, thus allowing the resource server(s) to verify the client's membership upon receiving the access token. Effectively, the profile enables fine-grained access control paired with secure group communication, in accordance with the Zero Trust principles. Additional Formats of Authentication Credentials for the Datagram Transport Layer Security (DTLS) Profile for Authentication and Authorization for Constrained Environments (ACE) RISE AB Ericsson AB This document updates the Datagram Transport Layer Security (DTLS) profile for Authentication and Authorization for Constrained Environments (ACE). In particular, it specifies the use of additional formats of authentication credentials for establishing a DTLS session, when peer authentication is based on asymmetric cryptography. Therefore, this document updates RFC 9202. What is defined in this document is seamlessly applicable also if the profile uses Transport Layer Security (TLS) instead of DTLS, as defined in RFC 9430.

Benefits for ACE Profiles For any profile of ACE, the following holds.

The SDC workflow defined in is effectively possible to use. This is beneficial for deployments where the communication leg between C and the RS is constrained, but the communication leg between the AS and RS is not.
When the SDC workflow is used, the "token_upload" parameter defined in is used:
- To inform the AS about C opting in to use the SDC workflow.
- To request the AS that the follow-up access token response includes certain information, if the AS has successfully uploaded the access token to the RS.
- To inform C that the AS has attempted to upload the access token to the RS, specifying whether the uploading has succeeded or failed.
When the SDC workflow is used, it remains possible for C to always obtain the issued access token from the AS. That is, by specifying the value 2 for the "token_upload" parameter in the access token request, C will ensure to receive the access token from the AS, even if the AS successfully uploads the access token to the RS on behalf of C. This is useful in profiles of ACE where C can re-upload the same access token to the RS by itself, e.g., in order to perform a key update like defined for the OSCORE profile .

DTLS Profile When the RPK mode of the DTLS profile is used (see ), it becomes possible for the AS to effectively issue an access token intended to an audience that includes multiple RSs. This is enabled by the parameters "rs_cnf2" and "audience2" defined in , as well as by the "anchor_cnf" parameter defined in . This seamlessly applies also if the profile uses Transport Layer Security (TLS) as defined in .

LAKE and OSCORE Profile When the LAKE and OSCORE profile is used , it becomes possible for the AS to effectively issue an access token intended to an audience that includes multiple RSs. This is enabled by the parameters "rs_cnf2" and "audience2" defined in , as well as by the "anchor_cnf" parameter defined in .

CDDL Model

CDDL model

Document Updates

Version -08 to -09

Renamed EDHOC to LAKE as appropriate.
Fixed use of "token_upload" values in access token response.
Used normative language on the AS creating a token series on the fly.
Guidance and requirements against possible group-audience mixup when using the "anchor_cnf" parameter.
Added example of AS-to-RS token upload using the "updated_rights" parameter.
SDC workflow with a group-audience: after a failed upload, the AS continues uploading the access token to any remaining RS (unless the error code "missing_old_token" is received).
Added "Operational Considerations" section.
Updated security considerations.
Editorial fixes and improvements.

Version -07 to -08

Extended creation of "token_upload" to support the creation of token series "on-the-fly" if need be.
Defined successful/failed token upload from the AS when the token targets a group-audience.
Defined EDHOC EAD item Session ID.
Clarifications:
- Relation between "token_upload" and use of RFC 9770.
- Values to avoid for "rs_cnf" in an access token request in some contexts.
IANA considerations:
- Added references to IANA registries.
- Added updates to recently registered OAuth parameters.
Fully decoupled the "to_rs" parameter from the "from_rs" parameter.
Editorial fixes and improvements.

Version -06 to -07

Updated requirements for using "rs_cnf" in an access token request.
More precise requirements on including/omitting parameters in access token request and response.
Specified parameter encoding when messages are encoded in JSON.
Moved content on dynamic update of access rights to the section about the "updated_rights" parameter.
Clarifications:
- Access token responses are successful by definition.
- Successful response in general vs. response with 2.01 code.
- Explained the case where the RS has forgotten the access token to supersede.
IANA considerations: update entry for "access_token" in the "OAuth Parameters" registry.
Editorial fixes and improvements.

Version -05 to -06

Defined dynamic update of access rights in the SDC workflow.
Defined the new "updated_rights" parameter.
Clarified practical requirements at the AS for processing the "to_rs" parameter.
IANA considerations: update in the "Parameter Usage Location" column for some entries of the "OAuth Parameters" registry.
Adjusted abbreviations in the CDDL model to avoid collisions.
Removed appendix with placeholder ideas.
Editorial fixes and improvements.

Version -04 to -05

Error handling and error code for failed PoP verification at the AS.
Extended definition of the parameters "to_rs" and "from_rs".
Fixes and presentation improvements in the IANA considerations.
Updated references.
Revised order of some sections.
Editorial fixes and improvements.

Version -03 to -04

Updated document title.
Defined name for the new workflow.
Improved definition of "token series".
Revised note on the new workflow suitable for "unaware" clients.
Revised criterion for the AS to choose a token series identifier.
Extended semantics of the "ace_profile" parameter.
Specified means for C and the AS to coordinate on the exchange of public authentication credentials.
Removed content on bidirectional access control.
Suggested value ranges for codepoints to register.
Editorial fixes and improvements.

Version -02 to -03

Defined parameter and claim "token_series_id".
Defined parameters "to_rs" and "from_rs".
Defined use of "to_rs" and "from_rs" in the OSCORE profile.
Lowercase use of "client", "resource server", and "authorization server".
Fixed naming of parameters/claims for audience.
Split elision and comments in the examples in CBOR Diagnostic Notation.
SHA-256 is mandatory to implement for computing token hashes.
Fixes in the IANA considerations.
Removed (parts of) appendices that are not needed anymore.
Clarifications and editorial improvements.

Version -01 to -02

CBOR diagnostic notation uses placeholders from a CDDL model.
Note on the new workflow supporting also non-ACE clients.
Revised semantics of the "token_upload" parameter.
Defined the new "token_hash" parameter.
First definition of bidirectional access control through a single access token.
Revised and extended considerations and next steps in appendices.
Clarifications and editorial improvements.

Version -00 to -01

Definition of the "token series" moved to the "Terminology" section.
Clarifications and fixes on using parameters in messages.
Amended two of the requirements on profiles of the framework.
The client has to opt-in for using the new workflow.
Parameter "token_uploaded" renamed to "token_upload".
Updated format of error response payload to use RFC 9290.
Security considerations inherited from other documents.
Editorial fixes and improvements.

Acknowledgments The authors sincerely thank , , and for their comments and feedback. This work was supported by the Sweden's Innovation Agency VINNOVA within the EUREKA CELTIC-NEXT project CYPRESS; and by the H2020 project SIFIS-Home (Grant agreement 952652).